

Modvind

Global divergens

- Ukraine konflikten trækker mørke skyer over Europa. USA er på vej i økonomisk topform, mens Kina er tilbage på vækstsportet.

Dansk økonomi udfordres igen

- Efter en stærk begyndelse på året, faldt dansk økonomi tilbage i andet kvartal. Konturerne af et ujævnt opsving tegner sig derfor fortsat.



OVERBLIK 04

MODVIND

DANMARK 08

ET UJÆVNT OPSVING TAGER FORM

USA 16

ENDELIG OP I GEAR

EUROOMRÅDET 18

INGEN STORE FORVENTNINGER

RUSLAND 23

TYNGENDE USIKKERHED

KINA 28

BALANCEGANG

OLIE 32

TRANSPORT DEN SIDSTE BASTION

Dataoverblik

| | |
|---------------|---|
| Nøgletal..... | 6 |
| Renter..... | 7 |
| Valuta..... | 7 |

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Redaktionel deadline

29 August 2014

Besøg os på:

<http://nexus.nordea.com>

Kilder:

Kilde til data i grafer er Macrobond og nationale statistikbureauer, med mindre andet er angivet.

| | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| ■ OVERBLIK Modvind..... | 4 |
|-----------------------------------|---|

Nordic economies

| | |
|---|----|
| ■ DANMARK Et ujævnt opsving tager form..... | 8 |
| ■ SWEDEN Moving forward in headwind..... | 10 |
| ■ NORWAY Oil investment a drag..... | 12 |
| ■ FINLAND How low can you go?..... | 14 |

Major economies

| | |
|--|----|
| ■ USA Finally kicking into higher gear..... | 16 |
| ■ EURO AREA No great expectations..... | 18 |
| ■ GERMANY Europe's locomotive faces headwinds from abroad..... | 20 |
| ■ UK Bank of Exit..... | 21 |
| ■ JAPAN The jury is still out..... | 22 |

Emerging Markets

| | |
|---|----|
| ■ RUSSIA Uncertainty weighs..... | 23 |
| ■ ESTONIA Recovery loses steam amid new headwinds..... | 25 |
| ■ LATVIA Post-euro optimism boosts consumer confidence..... | 26 |
| ■ LITHUANIA Cold winds blowing from the East..... | 27 |
| ■ CHINA Walk the line..... | 28 |
| ■ INDIA A way out for India..... | 30 |
| ■ BRAZIL Stuck in a growth rut..... | 31 |

Commodities

| | |
|--|----|
| ■ OIL Transport the last stronghold..... | 32 |
|--|----|

| | |
|--|----|
| ■ RISK SCENARIOS Risk scenarios..... | 33 |
|--|----|

Modvind

Verdensøkonomien er på ny ramt af modvind. Det spirende globale opsving i begyndelsen af året er blevet omgærdet af markant større usikkerhed i forbindelse med de tiltagende geopolitiske risici. Den koldkrigs-lignende tilstand mellem Vesten og Rusland over Ukraine er fortsat i en eskaleringsfase, og Mellemøsten har atter sat sig selv i fokus i form af de krigslignende tilstande i Gaza og fremmarchen af IS i Irak og Syrien.

På kort sigt har den geopolitiske uro og et svækket momentum hos flere af vores europæiske samhandelspartnere øget risikoen for en ny vækstmæssig skuffelse i dansk økonomi. I vores hovedscenario venter vi dog ikke, at denne uro sætter sig varige spor i det opsving, der forventes at nå en vækstrate på 1,7% i 2016 efter en fremgang på 0,5% i år og 1,3% i 2015. Væksten i dansk økonomi vil ikke mindst blive drevet af fremgang i det private forbrug, i takt med at stigende beskæftigelse og en positiv reallønsvækst øger husholdningernes disponible indkomster. Denne forventning understøttes samtidig af husholdningernes aktuelt optimistiske syn på fremtiden, deres store finansielle formuer og en gradvis forbedring af situationen på boligmarkedet, som befinder sig i en brydningstid præget af store regionale forskelle. Mens boligpriserne i visse dele af de store byer igen nærmer sig niveauet fra før finanskrisen, er der fortsat områder, hvor priserne stadig falder, og omsætningen står stille. Det er vores opfattelse, at der over de kommende år vil finde en vis spredningseffekt sted fra de områder, hvor priserne er steget, til de områder, der fortsat er præget af stagnation, men det er klart, at denne udvikling langt fra er sikker.

Konflikten i Ukraine rammer Europa

Det er ikke mindst Europa, som er ramt af de kolde vinde fra øst og har vist svaghestegn siden foråret. Efter flere kvartalers uafbrudt fremgang forsvandt væksten som dug for solen i 2. kvartal, og meget tyder på, at 3. kvartal også udvikler sig markant svagere end ventet tidligere på året.

Da 1. kvartal samtidig var meget svagere end ventet i USA og Kina, har vi på den baggrund nedjusteret skønnet for væksten i verdensøkonomien i år til 3,4% fra tidligere 3,7%, mens vi fortsat venter en fremgang i underkanten af 4% til næste år. I den nye prognose har vi for første gang også skøn for 2016, hvor vi ligeledes venter en fremgang omkring 4%, jf. tabellen.

| | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|---------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| Verden | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 3.9 |
| G3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
| BRIC | 5.8 | 5.8 | 5.7 | 5.8 | 5.9 |
| Norden | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 2.0 |
| Danmark | -0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 1.7 |
| Finland | -1.5 | -1.2 | -0.5 | 0.3 | 1.2 |
| Norge | 3.4 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 1.5 | 2.2 |
| Sverige | 0.9 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 2.5 | 2.3 |

Konflikten mellem Rusland og Vesten har nået sit foreløbige højdepunkt med Ruslands sanktioner mod en række landbrugsprodukter fra USA, Canada, Australien, EU og Norge. Som følge af den geografiske nærhed og for mange landes vedkommende ret tætte handelsforbindelser til Rusland rammer de nye koldkrigstendenser noget hårdere i Europa end andre steder. Det er ikke mindst de lande, som grænser op til Rusland, herunder de baltiske lande og Finland, som mærker den sibiriske kulde, men også Norge og Danmark har en betydelig landbrugs-eksport til Rusland.

For landbrugssektoren har sanktionerne store konsekvenser, men set i et makroøkonomisk perspektiv vil sanktionerne i sig selv ikke være nok til at slå det spirende europæiske opsving ud af kurs. Den direkte effekt varierer således fra 0,65% af BNP i Litauen over 0,15% i Danmark og Finland til helt uanseelige 0,01% i Sverige og Storbritannien. Usikkerheden knytter sig derfor især til de afledte effekter vedrørende erhvervs- og forbrugertilliden, som f.eks. kan føre til udskudte investeringsbeslutninger. I den forbindelse vækker det især bekymring, at det tyske vækstlokomotiv nu synes at være hårdt ramt. Det kan give betydelige følgevirkninger i andre europæiske lande, som måske endda fortsat slås med efterdønningerne fra finanskrisen eller endnu ikke er kommet ud af recessionen. På den baggrund venter vi en forholdsvis svag omend accelererende vækst hen over prognoseperioden.

Ekstremt lempelig pengepolitik

De forholdsvis svage udsigter for den europæiske økonomi rammer sammen med den meget lave inflation lige i hjertet i den europæiske centralbank, ECB. Bankens målsætning er som bekendt at holde inflationen tæt på, men under 2%, og i bestræbelserne på at ryste deflations-spøgelset af sig har ECB, som mange andre centralbanker, ført en ekstremt lempelig pengepolitik over de senere år. Pengepolitikken blev endda lempet yderligere i juni, hvor ECB for første gang satte indlånsrenten ned i negativt territorium og samtidig introducerede et målrettet likviditetstiltag over for pengeinstitutterne med henblik på at få gang i udlånsaktiviteten i euroområdet. Det er fortsat tvivlsomt, om programmet vil virke efter hensigten, hvorfor det er muligt, at ECB må ty til at lade seddelpressen køre i endnu højere tempo for at få gang i inflationen i forbindelse med et muligt opkøbsprogram af f.eks. stats- og kreditobligationer. Det har også været tilfældet for centralbankerne i USA, Storbritannien og Japan.

Det virker derimod ikke sandsynligt, at banken vælger at sætte renten yderligere ned, hvorfor vi på nuværende tidspunkt nøjes med at udsætte tidspunktet for den første ventede *rentestigning* fra ECB's side til 2017 – altså uden for vores prognosehorisont. Det betyder på sin side

også, at de lange europæiske renter vil være meget lave længe endnu.

USA på vej mod topformen

De angelsaksiske økonomier, Storbritannien og USA, er til gengæld fortsat på vej ind i et solidt opsving. Især den amerikanske økonomi er i færd med at bygge musklerne op, og det vigtige arbejdsmarked synes for alvor at være på vej i topform. Det er afgørende for såvel forbrugs- som investeringsudsigterne, og det skal bemærkes, at den lange periode med gældsnedbringelse i den private sektor er overstået. Der er således gode muligheder for, at den amerikanske økonomi hen over prognoseperioden vil opleve en ret stærk vækst, som dog ventes at toppe i 2015.

De gode udsigter for arbejdsmarkedet og en inflation, som allerede flirter med målsætningen på 2%, betyder, at Forbundsbanken (Fed) inden for relativt kort tid ventes at påbegynde en egentlig stramning af pengepolitikken. Afviklingen af bankens såkaldte kvantitative lempelsesprogram bliver efter planen gennemført i år, hvorefter Janet Yellen & Co. kan rette sigtet mod den første rentestigning siden juni 2006. Vi forventer, at den kommer allerede i løbet af 1. kvartal 2015, hvilket også vil sætte sine spor på de lange amerikanske renter, som ventes at stige hen over prognosehorisonten. Den tidligere stramning af pengepolitikken i USA end i euroområdet betyder endvidere, at der er udsigt til en styrkelse af USD over for EUR. Også Bank of England ventes at stramme pengepolitikken tidligere end ECB, hvilket også tilsiger en styrkelse af GBP over for EUR over de kommende år.

Kina tilbage på vækstsporet

Kina synes ligeledes at være kommet tilbage på vækstsporet efter en periodisk afmatning, som viste, hvor svært det er at indføre en ny vækstmodel baseret på privatforbruget snarere end eksporten og investeringerne i et land, hvor opsparingskvoten i husholdningerne historisk har været høj.

Gennem en økonomisk mini-stimuluspakke og en bevidst svækkelse af valutaen er det dog lykkedes myndighederne at få væksten tilbage omkring 7,5%, men der knytter sig også fortsatte risici til Kina – ikke mindst til boligmarkedet og overkapacitet i mange sektorer. Samtidig er det værd at påpege, at de geopolitiske risici også har fanget til Asien. Kina har territoriale konflikter med mange af sine nabolande, herunder Japan om de ubeboede øer Senkaku/Diaoyu. Konflikter, som i sidste instans kan påvirke handelsomfanget i regionen i negativ retning og på den måde også risikere at afspore det spirende japanske opsving.

Protektionisme ad bagdøren

Mens Kina således er kommet tilbage på vækstsporet, og fremtiden for Indien også tegner lysere som følge af den nye regeringschef Modis reformvillighed, ser den nære fremtid mere dystert ud for de øvrige BRIKS-lande. De råvareproducerende økonomier, Brasilien, Rusland og

Sydafrika, har nemlig været hårdt ramt af faldende råvarepriser, kapitalflugt, valutanedskrivning og tilhørende stramning af pengepolitikken. Konjunkturudsigterne for disse lande synes derfor forholdsvis mørke, hvilket på sin side risikerer at føre til en yderligere opbremsning i verdenshandlen. Dels fordi væksten bliver lavere, dels fordi det kan føre til øget protektionisme og imports substitution. WTO melder således om, at der siden oktober 2008 netto er registreret næsten 950 nye handelsrestriktioner, som dækker godt 5% af G20-landenes import. Det er en stærkt bekymrende udvikling, eftersom den frie handel mellem verdens lande er en af de vigtigste kilder til global vækst og produktivitet fremgang.

Norge er tilbage i den gule førertrøje i Norden

Også vores nordiske nabolande oplever i disse år – som resten af verden – et divergerende vækstmønster. Siden vores seneste nordiske prognose i juni har især norsk økonomi overrasket positivt, mens Sverige omvendt har skuffet vores forventninger, og Finland har testet nye bundniveauer.

Over prognosehorisonten venter vi, at den samlede nordiske vækst inkl. **Danmark** stiger fra 1,3% i år til 2% i 2016.

Som nævnt har især **Norge** overrasket positivt, og de seneste nøgletal har fortsat været på den stærke side. Forbrugsvæksten er solid og vil bidrage til at holde den samlede økonomiske vækst oppe i de kommende år, selvom 2015 kan markere et blødt punkt som følge af et ganske kraftigt fald i olieinvesteringerne.

Den ellers så stærke **svenske** økonomi har især skuffet, fordi eksporten mod forventning ikke er kommet rigtigt op af starthullerne på samme måde, som den indenlandske efterspørgsel er det, og de svagere udenlandske konjunkturer betyder, at der heller ikke er anledning til at vente et markant løft i eksporten over de kommende år. Den samlede økonomiske vækst vil derfor ikke accelerere voldsomt hen over prognoseperioden, som også er karakteriseret ved en kun moderat nedgang i arbejdsløsheden til trods for en pæn fremgang i beskæftigelsen.

Der er heller ikke tegn på fremgang for den i forvejen hårdt ramte **finske** eksportsektor, og økonomien vil formentlig i 2014 skrumpes for tredje år i træk. Finland er hårdt ramt af afmatningen i Rusland, som er et vigtigt eksportmarked, og rammes nu yderligere af sanktionspolitikken. Også den indenlandske efterspørgsel har udviklet sig svagt over de seneste år, og arbejdsløsheden nærmer sig nu 9%. Der er stadig større risiko for, at Finland vil havne i en uheldig deflationær spiral, og meget tyder på, at en nedjustering af Finlands AAA-rating efterhånden kun er et spørgsmål om tid.

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Realvækst, %

| | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|----------------------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| Verden ¹⁾ | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 3.9 |
| USA | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 3.1 | 2.8 |
| Euroområdet | -0.6 | -0.4 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.4 |
| Kina | 7.7 | 7.7 | 7.5 | 7.2 | 7.0 |
| Japan | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.4 |
| Danmark | -0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 1.7 |
| Norge | 3.4 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 1.5 | 2.2 |
| Sverige | 0.9 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 2.5 | 2.3 |
| UK | 0.3 | 1.7 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.2 |
| Tyskland | 0.9 | 0.5 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Frankrig | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 1.2 |
| Italien | -2.4 | -1.8 | -0.3 | 0.5 | 1.1 |
| Spanien | -1.6 | -1.2 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 1.8 |
| Finland | -1.5 | -1.2 | -0.5 | 0.3 | 1.2 |
| Estland | 3.9 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 2.7 | 3.5 |
| Letland | 5.2 | 4.1 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 4.1 |
| Polen | 2.1 | 1.6 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.5 |
| Rusland | 3.4 | 1.3 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 1.5 |
| Litauen | 3.7 | 3.3 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 4.3 |
| Indien | 4.7 | 4.7 | 5.1 | 5.8 | 6.3 |
| Brasilien | 1.0 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 2.1 |
| Resten af verden | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 3.2 | 3.4 |

¹⁾ Vægtet gennemsnit af 186 lande. De vægte der er benyttet, samt BNP- og inflationsdata for de lande Nordea ikke dækker, stammer fra den nyeste udgave af IMF's World Economic Outlook. Vægtningen er på baggrund af PPP-justeret BNP.

Inflation, %

| | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|----------------------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| Verden ¹⁾ | 4.1 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 4.2 |
| USA | 2.1 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.4 |
| Euroområdet | 2.5 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 1.2 | 1.6 |
| Kina | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 3.5 |
| Japan | 0.0 | 0.4 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.2 |
| Danmark | 2.4 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 1.6 |
| Norge | 0.7 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 1.6 |
| Sverige | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 1.8 |
| UK | 2.8 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| Tyskland | 2.1 | 1.6 | 0.9 | 1.5 | 1.8 |
| Frankrig | 2.2 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| Italien | 3.3 | 1.3 | 0.3 | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| Spanien | 2.4 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 1.3 |
| Finland | 2.8 | 1.5 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 0.8 |
| Estland | 3.9 | 2.8 | 0.4 | 2.0 | 2.5 |
| Letland | 2.3 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 1.7 | 2.0 |
| Polen | 3.7 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 2.2 |
| Rusland | 6.5 | 6.5 | 7.2 | 6.0 | 5.4 |
| Litauen | 3.1 | 1.0 | 0.3 | 1.5 | 2.3 |
| Indien | 9.7 | 10.1 | 7.9 | 7.1 | 6.2 |
| Brasilien | 5.4 | 6.2 | 6.5 | 5.9 | 5.5 |
| Resten af verden | 5.1 | 4.5 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 5.2 |

Offentlige finanser, % af BNP

| | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| USA | -6.8 | -4.1 | -2.9 | -2.6 | -3.0 |
| Euroområdet | -3.7 | -3.0 | -2.5 | -2.3 | -2.0 |
| Kina | -2.2 | -1.9 | -2.0 | -2.0 | -2.0 |
| Japan | -9.8 | -10.1 | -9.5 | -9.0 | -9.0 |
| Danmark | -3.9 | -0.9 | -0.3 | -2.9 | -2.2 |
| Norge | 13.9 | 10.9 | 11.0 | 11.2 | 10.8 |
| Sverige | -0.7 | -1.2 | -2.2 | -1.4 | -0.6 |
| UK | -6.1 | -5.8 | -5.0 | -4.0 | -3.1 |
| Tyskland | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Frankrig | -4.9 | -4.3 | -3.9 | -3.5 | -3.0 |
| Italien | -2.9 | -2.8 | -2.6 | -2.2 | -2.0 |
| Spanien | -10.6 | -7.1 | -5.6 | -6.0 | -4.0 |
| Finland | -1.8 | -2.1 | -1.8 | -1.9 | -1.6 |
| Estland | -0.2 | -0.2 | -0.5 | -0.9 | -0.5 |
| Letland | -1.4 | -0.9 | -1.0 | -1.5 | -1.0 |
| Polen | -3.9 | -4.3 | -4.0 | 5.0 | -2.5 |
| Rusland | -0.2 | -0.8 | 0.0 | -0.5 | -0.7 |
| Litauen | -3.3 | -2.2 | -2.2 | -2.0 | -1.0 |
| Indien | -7.4 | -7.3 | -7.0 | -6.5 | -6.0 |
| Brasilien | -2.8 | -3.3 | -3.4 | -3.0 | -2.8 |

Betalingsbalance, % af BNP

| | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|-------------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| USA | -2.9 | -2.4 | -2.5 | -2.5 | -2.5 |
| Euroområdet | 1.8 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.2 |
| Kina | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.5 |
| Japan | 1.0 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.5 |
| Danmark | 6.0 | 7.1 | 5.9 | 5.3 | 4.4 |
| Norge | 14.3 | 11.1 | 10.7 | 11.0 | 10.5 |
| Sverige | 6.5 | 6.8 | 6.0 | 5.6 | 6.0 |
| UK | -3.8 | -4.5 | -3.9 | -3.2 | -2.7 |
| Tyskland | 7.0 | 7.4 | 7.3 | 7.0 | 6.0 |
| Frankrig | -2.1 | -1.9 | -1.8 | -2.0 | -1.8 |
| Italien | -0.4 | 0.9 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.2 |
| Spanien | -1.2 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.7 |
| Finland | -1.9 | -2.0 | -1.9 | -1.6 | -1.4 |
| Estland | -1.8 | -1.1 | -1.2 | -1.6 | -1.8 |
| Letland | -2.5 | -0.8 | -2.0 | -2.5 | -3.0 |
| Polen | -3.7 | -1.4 | -1.5 | -2.0 | -2.5 |
| Rusland | 3.6 | 1.5 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.0 |
| Litauen | -0.2 | 1.5 | -1.8 | -3.0 | -2.0 |
| Indien | -4.7 | -2.0 | -0.5 | -1.0 | -1.5 |
| Brasilien | -2.4 | -3.6 | -3.3 | -2.9 | -2.6 |

Pengepolitiske styringsrenter

| | 2.9.14 | 3M | 30.6.15 | 31.12.15 | 31.12.16 |
|-------------|--------|-------|---------|----------|----------|
| USA | 0,25 | 0,25 | 0,75 | 1,25 | 2,50 |
| Japan | 0,10 | 0,10 | 0,10 | 0,10 | 0,10 |
| Euroområdet | 0,15 | 0,15 | 0,15 | 0,15 | 0,15 |
| Danmark | 0,20 | 0,20 | 0,20 | 0,30 | 0,40 |
| Sverige | 0,25 | 0,25 | 0,25 | 0,25 | 1,00 |
| Norge | 1,50 | 1,50 | 1,50 | 1,50 | 1,50 |
| UK | 0,50 | 0,50 | 0,75 | 1,25 | 2,25 |
| Schweiz | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,00 |
| Polen | 2,50 | 2,00 | 2,00 | 2,50 | 3,00 |
| Rusland | 8,00 | 8,25 | 8,00 | 7,50 | 7,00 |
| Kina | 6,00 | 6,00 | 6,00 | 6,00 | 6,25 |
| Indien | 8,00 | 8,00 | 7,75 | 7,50 | 7,00 |
| Brasilien | 11,00 | 11,00 | 12,00 | 12,00 | 12,00 |

3 mdr. renter

| | 2.9.14 | 3M | 30.6.15 | 31.12.15 | 31.12.16 |
|-------------|--------|-------|---------|----------|----------|
| USA | 0,23 | 0,25 | 0,80 | 1,40 | 2,75 |
| Euroområdet | 0,17 | 0,20 | 0,20 | 0,25 | 0,30 |
| Danmark | 0,36 | 0,35 | 0,35 | 0,45 | 0,55 |
| Sverige | 0,50 | 0,50 | 0,50 | 0,50 | 1,30 |
| Norge | 1,76 | 1,75 | 1,75 | 1,75 | 1,75 |
| UK | 0,56 | 0,60 | 0,85 | 1,40 | 2,50 |
| Polen | 2,60 | 2,75 | 2,75 | 3,00 | 3,50 |
| Rusland | 10,21 | 10,10 | 9,40 | 9,00 | 8,50 |
| Litauen | 0,32 | 0,30 | 0,20 | 0,20 | 0,40 |

10-årige benchmark statsobligationsrenter

| | 2.9.14 | 3M | 30.6.15 | 31.12.15 | 31.12.16 |
|-------------|--------|------|---------|----------|----------|
| USA | 2,34 | 2,70 | 2,90 | 3,25 | 4,10 |
| Euroområdet | 0,89 | 1,20 | 1,40 | 1,55 | 1,90 |
| Danmark | 1,20 | 1,35 | 1,60 | 1,75 | 2,05 |
| Sverige | 1,41 | 1,70 | 2,00 | 2,30 | 2,70 |
| Norge | 2,24 | 2,65 | 2,88 | 3,00 | 3,20 |
| UK | 2,38 | 2,80 | 3,00 | 3,30 | 3,70 |
| Polen | 3,07 | 3,50 | 3,50 | 4,50 | 5,00 |

Valutakurser mod DKK

| | 2.9.14 | 3M | 30.6.15 | 31.12.15 | 31.12.16 |
|-----------------------|--------|------|---------|----------|----------|
| EUR/DKK | 7,45 | 7,46 | 7,46 | 7,46 | 7,46 |
| USD/DKK | 5,66 | 5,65 | 5,83 | 5,97 | 6,11 |
| JPY/DKK ¹⁾ | 5,45 | 5,48 | 5,45 | 5,43 | 5,32 |
| SEK/DKK | 0,81 | 0,80 | 0,82 | 0,84 | 0,86 |
| NOK/DKK | 0,91 | 0,92 | 0,93 | 0,93 | 0,93 |
| GBP/DKK | 9,39 | 9,44 | 9,56 | 9,82 | 9,95 |
| CHF/DKK | 6,18 | 6,11 | 6,11 | 5,83 | 5,74 |
| PLN/DKK | 1,76 | 1,78 | 1,73 | 1,78 | 1,87 |
| RUB/DKK | 0,15 | 0,16 | 0,17 | 0,17 | 0,18 |
| LTL/DKK | 2,16 | 2,16 | 2,16 | 2,16 | 2,16 |
| CNY/DKK | 0,92 | 0,93 | 0,97 | 1,00 | 1,04 |
| INR/DKK | 0,09 | 0,09 | 0,10 | 0,10 | 0,12 |
| BRL/DKK | 2,53 | 2,46 | 2,43 | 2,54 | 2,66 |

¹⁾ Pr. 100 enheder

Pengepolitisk rentespænd til euroområdet

| | 2.9.14 | 3M | 30.6.15 | 31.12.15 | 31.12.16 |
|---------------------|--------|-------|---------|----------|----------|
| USA | 0,10 | 0,10 | 0,60 | 1,10 | 2,35 |
| Japan ¹⁾ | -0,15 | -0,15 | -0,65 | -1,15 | -2,40 |
| Euroområdet | - | - | - | - | - |
| Danmark | 0,05 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 0,15 | 0,25 |
| Sverige | 0,10 | 0,10 | 0,10 | 0,10 | 0,85 |
| Norge | 1,35 | 1,35 | 1,35 | 1,35 | 1,35 |
| UK | 0,35 | 0,35 | 0,60 | 1,10 | 2,10 |
| Schweiz | -0,15 | -0,15 | -0,15 | -0,15 | -0,15 |
| Polen | 2,35 | 1,85 | 1,85 | 2,35 | 2,85 |
| Rusland | 7,85 | 8,10 | 7,85 | 7,35 | 6,85 |
| Kina | 5,85 | 5,85 | 5,85 | 5,85 | 6,10 |
| Indien | 7,85 | 7,85 | 7,60 | 7,35 | 6,85 |
| Brasilien | 10,85 | 10,85 | 11,85 | 11,85 | 11,85 |

¹⁾ Spænd til USA

3 mdr. rentespænd til euroområdet

| | 2.9.14 | 3M | 30.6.15 | 31.12.15 | 31.12.16 |
|-------------|--------|------|---------|----------|----------|
| USA | 0,07 | 0,05 | 0,60 | 1,15 | 2,45 |
| Euroområdet | - | - | - | - | - |
| Danmark | 0,19 | 0,15 | 0,15 | 0,20 | 0,25 |
| Sverige | 0,33 | 0,30 | 0,30 | 0,25 | 1,00 |
| Norge | 1,59 | 1,55 | 1,55 | 1,50 | 1,45 |
| UK | 0,39 | 0,40 | 0,65 | 1,15 | 2,20 |
| Polen | 2,43 | 2,55 | 2,55 | 2,75 | 3,20 |
| Rusland | 10,04 | 9,90 | 9,20 | 8,75 | 8,20 |
| Litauen | 0,15 | 0,10 | 0,00 | -0,05 | 0,10 |

10-årigt rentespænd til euroområdet

| | 2.9.14 | 3M | 30.6.15 | 31.12.15 | 31.12.16 |
|-------------|--------|------|---------|----------|----------|
| USA | 1,45 | 1,50 | 1,50 | 1,70 | 2,20 |
| Euroområdet | - | - | - | - | - |
| Danmark | 0,31 | 0,15 | 0,20 | 0,20 | 0,15 |
| Sverige | 0,52 | 0,50 | 0,60 | 0,75 | 0,80 |
| Norge | 1,35 | 1,45 | 1,48 | 1,45 | 1,30 |
| UK | 1,49 | 1,60 | 1,60 | 1,75 | 1,80 |
| Polen | 2,19 | 2,30 | 2,10 | 2,95 | 3,10 |

Valutakurser mod EUR og USD

| | 2.9.14 | 3M | 30.6.15 | 31.12.15 | 31.12.16 |
|-----------------------|--------|-------|---------|----------|----------|
| EUR/USD | 1,32 | 1,32 | 1,28 | 1,25 | 1,22 |
| EUR/JPY ¹⁾ | 137 | 136 | 137 | 138 | 140 |
| EUR/GBP | 0,79 | 0,79 | 0,78 | 0,76 | 0,75 |
| EUR/CHF | 1,21 | 1,22 | 1,22 | 1,28 | 1,30 |
| EUR/SEK | 9,19 | 9,30 | 9,10 | 8,90 | 8,70 |
| EUR/NOK | 8,14 | 8,10 | 8,00 | 8,00 | 8,00 |
| EUR/PLN | 4,22 | 4,20 | 4,30 | 4,20 | 4,00 |
| USD/JPY | 103,8 | 103,0 | 107,0 | 110,0 | 115,0 |
| GBP/USD | 1,66 | 1,67 | 1,64 | 1,64 | 1,63 |
| USD/CHF | 0,92 | 0,92 | 0,95 | 1,02 | 1,07 |
| USD/SEK | 6,97 | 7,05 | 7,11 | 7,12 | 7,13 |
| USD/NOK | 6,18 | 6,14 | 6,25 | 6,40 | 6,56 |
| USD/PLN | 3,21 | 3,18 | 3,36 | 3,36 | 3,28 |
| USD/CNY | 6,14 | 6,10 | 6,02 | 5,95 | 5,90 |
| USD/INR | 60,6 | 60,0 | 59,0 | 57,0 | 52,0 |
| USD/BRL | 2,24 | 2,30 | 2,40 | 2,35 | 2,30 |

Et ujævnt opsving tager form

- Væksten vender langsomt tilbage til dansk økonomi
- Velstanden udvikler sig bedre end produktionen
- Lyse og mørke sider på arbejdsmarkedet
- Skævvredet boligmarked

Et økonomisk opsving bevæger sig sjældent i en lige linje. Nogle perioder stiger væksten kraftigt, mens den i andre periode er mere afdæmpet – eller måske endda direkte negativ. Sådant et taktløst opsving er lige nu ved at tage form i dansk økonomi. På kort sigt har en stigende geopolitisk uro og et svækket momentum hos flere af vores europæiske samhandelspartnere øget risikoen for en ny vækstmæssig skuffelse i dansk økonomi. I vores hovedscenarier venter vi dog ikke, at denne uro sætter sig varige spor i det opsving, der forventes at nå en vækstrate på 1,7% i 2016.

Forløsning, men ingen fest, i det private forbrug

Efter en lang periode med stilstand er det private forbrug igen begyndt at vokse. Og selvom væksten er betydeligt langsommere end det historiske gennemsnit, så vidner det om, at efterspørgslen er på vej tilbage til dansk økonomi. Over de seneste år er det først og fremmest husholdningernes forbrug af varer, der har været under pres, mens efterspørgslen efter serviceydelser har klaret sig væsentligt bedre. Det kan også tydeligt ses på salget fra de danske butikker, der målt på mængder fortsat er 13% under niveauet fra 2007. Over det seneste år er detailsalget dog langsomt begyndt at vokse igen. Vi forventer, at denne udvikling fortsætter over de kommende år, i takt med at stigende beskæftigelse og en positiv reallønsvækst øger husholdningernes disponible indkomster. Denne forventning understøttes samtidig af husholdningernes optimistiske syn på fremtiden, store finansielle

formuer og en gradvis forbedring af situationen på boligmarkedet.

På trods af alle disse faktorer, der samstemmende peger i retning af et øget forbrug i husholdningerne, så er der ikke opræk til en egentlig fest i det private forbrug. Det skyldes, at husholdningerne fortsat nedbringer deres samlede gæld relativt til den disponible indkomst. Det sker, selvom den seneste udlånsundersøgelse fra Nationalbanken viser, at penge- og realkreditinstitutterne generelt har lempet kreditstandarderne en smule det seneste halve år, samtidig med at husholdningernes efterspørgsel efter nye lån er steget. Vi vurderer, at den igangværende gældsnedbringelse endnu ikke er tilendebragt, hvilket vil begrænse stigningspotentialer i det private forbrug over de kommende år.

Midlertidig afmatning i eksporten

Geopolitisk uro og et lavere vækstmomentum i euroområdet har hen over sommeren lagt et nedadgående pres på produktionsforventningerne i industrien. De svækkede udsigter for eksporten øger risikoen for, at opsvinget i dansk økonomi bliver svagere end hidtil forventet. I vores hovedscenarier venter vi dog kun, at der bliver tale om en relativ kortvarig svækkelse, inden en stigende efterspørgsel på de vigtigste afsætningsmarkeder igen vil trække eksporten højere. Alligevel ventes overskuddet på handelsbalancen at blive reduceret, fordi den ventede bedring i privatforbruget og investeringsaktiviteten vil trække importen højere. Dermed er der også udsigt til, at det store overskud på betalingsbalancen bliver reduceret hen over prognoseperioden.

Velstanden er større end produktionen

Værdien af den samlede produktion på dansk jord er fortsat mere end 4% under niveauet fra 2008. Dette traditio-

Danmark: Makroøkonomiske nøgletal (realvækst i pct. med mindre andet er angivet)

| | 2011 (DKKbn) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|---|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Privatforbrug | 872 | -0.1 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 1.6 | 2.1 |
| Offentligt forbrug | 508 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 0.6 |
| Faste bruttoinvesteringer i alt | 314 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 3.2 |
| - offentlige investeringer | 40 | 7.7 | -0.7 | 3.5 | -4.6 | -4.0 |
| - boliginvesteringer | 82 | -8.0 | -5.0 | 4.0 | 2.0 | 4.8 |
| - faste erhvervsinvesteringer | 192 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.0 | 3.6 | 4.1 |
| Lagerinvesteringer* | 4 | -0.3 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Eksport | 962 | 0.4 | 1.0 | 2.5 | 3.3 | 4.2 |
| Import | 868 | 0.9 | 1.4 | 5.0 | 4.5 | 4.7 |
| BNP | | -0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 1.7 |
| BNP nominel (mia. DKK) | 1,792 | 1,826 | 1,857 | 1,873 | 1,893 | 1,925 |
| Arbejdsløshed, % | | 6.1 | 5.8 | 5.1 | 5.1 | 4.9 |
| Bruttoarbejdsløshed, 1000 personer | | 161.7 | 153.0 | 135.8 | 134.6 | 130.1 |
| Forbrugerpriser, % årsvækst | | 2.4 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 1.6 |
| Timelønninger (DA/LO-området), % årsvækst | | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.8 |
| Nominelle huspriser, enfamilie, % y/y | | -3.3 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 3.5 |
| Betalingsbalance (mia. DKK) | | 109.2 | 131.6 | 110.0 | 100.0 | 85.0 |
| - % af BNP | | 6.0 | 7.1 | 5.9 | 5.3 | 4.4 |
| Offentlig budgetsaldo (mia. DKK) | | -71.9 | -15.8 | -5.0 | -54.0 | -43.0 |
| - % af BNP | | -3.9 | -0.9 | -0.3 | -2.9 | -2.2 |
| Offentlig gæld, % af BNP | | 45.3 | 44.4 | 44.4 | 45.2 | 45.7 |

* Bidrag til BNP-vækst (%-point)

nelle billede af udviklingen i dansk økonomi ændres imidlertid, hvis der i stedet for produktion fokuseres på den samlede indkomst, som bliver skabt. Herved ses, at det danske velstandsniveau er tilbage på før-krise niveauet, og at der navnlig siden starten af 2013 er sket en betydelig fremgang. Forskellen mellem indkomst og produktionskabelsen skyldes, at danske virksomheder har lagt mere produktion i udlandet, og samtidig er det resultatet af et stort løbende afkast på Danmarks nettoformue over for udlandet. De stigende indtægter fra udenlandske løn- og formueindkomster er en integreret del af det bolværk, som under krisen sikrede Danmarks status som sikker havn på de finansielle markeder.

Lyse og mørke sider på arbejdsmarkedet

Udviklingen på arbejdsmarkedet har overrasket positivt. Over det seneste år er beskæftigelsen steget, og arbejdsløsheden har været støt faldende – om end en væsentlig del af dette fald kan forklares med en øget afgang fra arbejdsmarkedet. Og netop det stigende antal personer, der under krisen har forladt det danske arbejdsmarked, kan på sigt vise sig at blive særdeles omkostningsfuldt. Ifølge den nyeste arbejdskraftundersøgelse er andelen af personer i den erhvervsaktive alder, der deltager aktivt på arbejdsmarkedet, faldet til det laveste niveau siden statistikkens start i 1996. Hvis faldet i erhvervsfrekvensen bliver permanent, vil det reducere det langsigtede vækstpotentiale og samtidig sætte de offentlige budgetter under et maksimalt pres. På den baggrund er det tvingende nødvendigt, at Folketinget fortsætter de seneste års strukturreformer af dansk økonomi rettet mod at øge arbejdsudbuddet og skabe en forbedret produktivitet.

Skævvredet boligmarked


Det danske boligmarked står i en brydningstid. Målt som landsgennemsnit har priserne over det seneste halvandet år været opadgående, anført af markedet for ejerlejligheder omkring de største byer. Trods de højere priser er lageret af usolgte boliger relativt til det faktiske salg dog fortsat meget stort. Sammenholdt med en meget lav byggeaktivitet betyder det, at boligmarkedet endnu ikke er i en tilstand, hvor det for alvor bidrager til at trække den samlede aktivitet i økonomien højere.

Vi forventer, at prisstigningerne fortsætter hen over prognoseperioden – understøttet af en stigende beskæftigelse og meget lave renter. Der vil dog blive tale om store geografiske forskelle, hvor prisstigninger vil være koncentreret omkring de store byer, hvor en demografisk tilflytning vil skabe en øget efterspørgsel. Omvendt vil boliger langt fra disse epicentre være mere udsat for et nedadgående prispres som følge af den skævvredne balance mellem udbud og efterspørgsel. Prisudviklingen i disse områder vil dog i en vis udstrækning blive understøttet af spredningseffekten fra de større byer, hvor priserne nogle steder nærmer sig niveauerne fra 2007.


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
Højere vækst i vente




Velstanden stiger hurtigere end produktionen



Efterspørgsel efter varer under pres



Lav aktivitet på boligmarkedet



Moving forward in headwind

- Continued subdued exports slow GDP growth
- Inflation is rising but will not hit 2% target
- Rate hike some way off
- SEK under pressure near term; set to gain longer out

Economy still divided

The Swedish economy has shown mixed trends in recent years. The domestic economy has put in a strong performance, whereas exports have stagnated. This pattern is expected to remain largely intact as we look for only a modest pick-up in exports. GDP growth will thus not accelerate sharply. And inflation will not hit the 2% target during the forecast period, which suggests that Riksbank rate hikes are a long way off.

Subdued demand in export markets

Sweden's export markets will expand by only 2.5% this year, rising to 4% in 2016. These are low growth rates in a historical perspective. In the past 20 years, market growth has been an average 6% y/y per year.

The Euro area, which absorbs nearly 40% of Swedish exports, is the key brake. Total imports in the Euro area stagnated in both 2012 and 2013 and the recovery will be slow in coming years. The US and Norway are bright spots, though; almost 20% of Swedish exports go to these markets. The depreciation of the SEK provides welcome relief as it makes room for improved profitability. But the weaker currency is not likely to contribute much to higher export volumes and will thus not change the subdued export outlook.

Households spending and borrowing

Households' already favourable financial conditions have improved further thanks to the continued decline in mortgage rates. The expansionary climate is reflected in rapidly growing consumption, rising house prices and higher residential construction activity. The high activity in the housing market shows through in households' demand for credits. At the moment household indebtedness is rising by SEK 13bn or 0.4% of GDP per month.

At the same time as indebtedness is growing, household savings have also risen to a historically high level. Savings are high also compared with many other countries. The increase is probably partially structural as social security benefit levels have been reduced.

Measures introduced to curb the increase in household indebtedness may also have lifted household savings. Further measures will probably be launched after the turn of the year. Judging from the signals from the authorities, the first move will likely be reforms to increase amortisation. We believe that these measures will initially have some dampening effect, but still leave scope for significant credit growth and a continued increase in house prices and consumer spending.

In future, the fiscal policy line will give households less tailwind. There is a political consensus to reverse this year's budget deficit of some 2% of GDP to a surplus.

The economy is also showing mixed trends in terms of investment activity. Construction investment, which is mainly driven by domestic conditions, is rising. But machinery investment, which is largely reliant on the export

Sweden: Macroeconomic indicators (% annual real changes unless otherwise stated)

| | 2011 (SEKbn) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|---|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Private consumption | 1,671 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.1 |
| Government consumption | 924 | 0.3 | 2.0 | 0.9 | 1.4 | 0.8 |
| Fixed investment | 651 | 3.3 | -1.1 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 3.5 |
| - industrial investment | 85 | 8.3 | -4.4 | -4.0 | 3.9 | 5.2 |
| - residential investment | 125 | -11.2 | 6.3 | 19.6 | 7.0 | 3.0 |
| Stockbuilding* | 40 | -1.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Exports | 1,735 | 0.7 | -0.4 | 2.7 | 4.4 | 4.6 |
| Imports | 1,541 | -0.6 | -0.8 | 4.5 | 4.8 | 4.1 |
| GDP | | 0.9 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 2.5 | 2.3 |
| GDP, calendar adjusted | | 1.3 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.1 |
| Nominal GDP (SEKbn) | 3,481 | 3,550 | 3,641 | 3,755 | 3,900 | 4,053 |
| Unemployment rate, % | | 8.0 | 8.0 | 7.9 | 7.6 | 7.4 |
| Employment, % y/y | | 0.6 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 0.6 |
| Consumer prices, % y/y | | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 1.8 |
| Underlying prices (CPIF), % y/y | | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 1.4 | 1.5 |
| Hourly earnings, % y/y | | 2.8 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 3.3 |
| Current account balance (SEKbn) | | 229.1 | 245.8 | 226.0 | 249.0 | 258.0 |
| - % of GDP | | 6.5 | 6.8 | 6.0 | 5.6 | 6.0 |
| Trade balance, % of GDP | | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.4 |
| General government budget balance (SEKbn) | | -26.4 | -44.5 | -82.0 | -54.8 | -24.0 |
| - % of GDP | | -0.7 | -1.2 | -2.2 | -1.4 | -0.6 |
| General government gross debt, % of GDP | | 38.3 | 40.5 | 42.4 | 41.7 | 41.3 |

* Contribution to GDP growth, percentage points.

industry, is showing a weak trend.

Employment rises but few inflation triggers

The labour market continues to improve; employment as well as labour supply is rising steadily. However, unemployment is sticky and will likely decline only slowly during the forecast period.

Although the available labour market resources should not be overestimated, we see no risk of major bottlenecks in the next few years. Given the pressure on the export industry, which is the benchmark for wage agreements, coming pay talks are likely to result in relatively low wage growth as far ahead as 2016.

The SEK depreciation so far this year will slow the previous sharp decline in import prices, but it will not markedly change the inflation outlook, particularly as the currency weakening is believed to be temporary.

A shift is also occurring in terms of taxation – from several years of cuts to certain hikes next year. The government has announced plans to raise duties on cars, alcohol and tobacco. The Riksdag election on 14 September may result in a new government, which could lead to more tax hikes and a consequent effect on inflation. However, the parliamentary situation is unclear and it is not known how much clout a new government will have.

SEK under pressure with soft Riksbank


Inflation will move higher, but it is not believed to reach the 2% target during the forecast period. The Riksbank is struggling to maintain its inflation targeting credibility, which explains the aggressive rate cut to a historically low level of 0.25% in July this year. Given the Riksbank’s strong emphasis on inflation, our inflation forecast and the ECB’s expansionary monetary policy, we believe that the Riksbank will hike interest rates late in the forecast period and at a cautious pace.

The conditions are in place for a stronger SEK, as the relatively sound Swedish economy speaks in favour of a less expansionary monetary policy than in many other countries. However, the Riksbank’s current soft monetary policy line will weigh on the SEK near term. Moreover, if the process to form a new government after the election draws out, uncertainties could weaken the SEK. However, the Riksbank looks set to gradually hike its policy rate ahead of for instance the ECB, which will make the SEK gain terrain again longer out. But it will gradually weaken against the USD as early rate hikes from the Fed will support the dollar.


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
Slow global recovery weighs on Swedish exports




Household credit growth accelerates



Improved labour market



Core inflation will not hit the target



Oil investment a drag

- Growth to slow in 2015
- Moderate inflation and wage growth
- Rates on hold for a long time

Better now, but slowdown more likely in 2015

Over the summer we have seen mixed signals from the Norwegian economy. The first survey of oil companies' investment plans for 2015 confirmed our belief that oil investment has peaked and will decline next year. Lower oil investment will act as a drag on growth far beyond the oil services industry. Consequently, we still expect growth to slow next year to around 1½% and unemployment to edge slightly higher. In 2016 GDP growth should rise to around 2%. Developments so far this year have, however, been stronger than we had expected. There are signs of declining unemployment and recent consumption readings have been benign. Fairly decent consumption growth should also curb the downtrend in GDP growth going forward.

Declining oil investment

The June survey of oil companies' investment plans for 2015 is preliminary and more investment projects are in the pipeline. We expect fairly large upward revisions to the readings. For instance the Johan Sverdrup field, which will lead to some activity as early as 2015, was not included in the survey. But even including this, the survey points to a real drop in oil investment of 15% from 2014 to 2015, which is slightly more than our previous estimate. We look for zero investment growth in 2016.

The shift from years of strong growth in oil investment to declining growth will have a relatively strong impact on the Norwegian economy. Not only producers of drilling equipment etc will be hit; services such as engineering

and traditional business services will also be affected. Many areas may move from skill shortage to skill surplus, which would dampen wage growth in these areas and, eventually, wage growth in general. Lower profitability in some sectors and a need to adapt to new markets should also put a lid on wage growth.

Consumers appear more optimistic

The pace of house price increases has accelerated driven by banks' increased willingness to lend. But we think that the pace will decelerate again during the remainder of the year and that prices will stay largely unchanged in 2015. House prices are already high, and with slightly rising unemployment and moderate wage growth, the probability of much higher prices is low. With an improved market for existing homes, residential construction will likely increase going forward, but not become a major growth engine due to the moderate price growth.

The outlook for consumer spending is more uncertain. Consumption growth this year has been surprisingly strong, but to some extent we see this as a temporary phenomenon. Modest real wage growth and slightly higher unemployment suggest moderate consumption growth going forward. On the other hand, interest rates are low and the savings rate high, which point to relatively good consumption growth. We see consumer spending rising just over 2% in 2015 and 2016, which means that consumption growth to some extent will offset the negative effect of declining oil investment on GDP growth.

Exports and government spending drive growth

Net exports from the mainland economy will likely also contribute positively to GDP growth. Improved conditions internationally and last year's NOK weakening point to an increase in mainland exports. And with im-

Norway: Macroeconomic indicators (% annual real changes unless otherwise noted)

| | 2011 (NOKbn) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|---|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Private consumption | 1,130 | 3.0 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| Government consumption | 592 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| Fixed investment | 539 | 8.3 | 8.4 | -0.5 | -2.8 | 1.4 |
| - gross investment, mainland | 375 | 4.5 | 4.4 | -0.1 | 2.8 | 2.0 |
| - gross investment, oil | 144 | 17.4 | 15.1 | 1.0 | -15.0 | 0.0 |
| Stockbuilding* | 114 | -0.1 | -0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Exports | 1,154 | 1.1 | -3.3 | -0.7 | 1.3 | 1.5 |
| - crude oil and natural gas | 568 | 0.7 | -7.7 | -3.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| - other goods | 316 | 1.7 | 0.4 | 2.4 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| Imports | 779 | 2.3 | 2.9 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 2.3 |
| GDP | 2,751 | 2.9 | 0.6 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.7 |
| GDP, mainland | 2,075 | 3.4 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 1.5 | 2.2 |
| Unemployment rate, % | | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 3.9 |
| Consumer prices, % y/y | | 0.7 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 1.6 |
| Core prices, % y/y | | 1.2 | 1.6 | 2.5 | 1.7 | 1.6 |
| Annual wages, % y/y | | 4.5 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.3 |
| Current account balance (NOKbn) | | 417.2 | 333.6 | 332.4 | 351.4 | 346.4 |
| - % of GDP | | 14.3 | 11.1 | 10.7 | 11.0 | 10.5 |
| Trade balance (NOKbn) | | 427.7 | 378.6 | 301.5 | 317.7 | 303.7 |
| - % of GDP | | 14.7 | 12.6 | 9.7 | 9.9 | 9.2 |
| General government budget balance (NOKbn) | | 404.5 | 327.1 | 343.0 | 358.9 | 357.5 |
| - % of GDP | | 13.9 | 10.9 | 11.0 | 11.2 | 10.8 |

* Contribution to GDP growth (% points)

ports growth, net exports from the mainland economy should grow at a healthy clip next year. Growth in government consumption and perhaps especially investment should also be quite high, underpinning GDP growth. But mainland business investment is expected to be hit by the lower activity in the oil services industries. Still, relatively strong growth in consumer-oriented sectors and an initially low investment level will prevent a drop in mainland investment.

Low wage and price growth

Core inflation in H1 2014 was on target and 1½% points higher than during the same period in 2013. The increase is attributable to higher import prices in the wake of NOK weakening and more sharply rising prices of Norwegian goods and services, notably food. The effect of the NOK weakening will gradually fade, and we think that lower wage growth will dampen the rate of increase in the prices of Norwegian goods and services. In 2015 we see inflation dropping below 2% and subsequently remain in the 1½-2% range.

Interest rates to remain low for a long time

Weak growth at least in 2015, slightly rising unemployment, moderate wage growth and inflation well below target suggest that interest rates will stay low for a long time. But for the sake of financial stability, a rate cut is not likely. The fact that the NOK would start to weaken the minute a rate cut becomes a theme makes it even more unlikely. In 2016 growth should accelerate, but inflation pressures will remain low, and we therefore expect Norges Bank to stay on hold also in 2016. And unchanged rates in the Euro area further underpin unchanged rates in Norway.

With a flat trend in interest rates in Norway and the Euro area, EUR/NOK should remain fairly stable. But with overall EUR weakness and slightly higher growth in Norway in 2016, the NOK may strengthen versus the EUR over the forecast period.

Consumers the wild card

Consumer spending has surprised on the upside, which could be a sign of a sharper, more permanent turnaround. Also the pace of house price increases is currently high. Consumption accounts for a much larger share of demand in the mainland economy than oil investment, so in the event of higher-than-expected consumption growth, overall growth may be higher than we expect. If house price growth also triggers renewed fears of financial imbalances, a rate hike could come earlier than expected. However, should Norges Bank signal an imminent rate hike, the NOK will likely strengthen, and possibly so much so that Norges Bank will be forced to back off.

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
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
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
Manufacturing hit by oil investment




Unemployment heading south



Strong consumption



Homes for sale herald better times ahead



How low can you go?

- Sanctions destroy economic recovery
- Slower rise in wages, prices and pensions
- Economy up in H2 2015, driven by exports
- Continued weakness in consumption and investment

Sanctions destroy economic recovery

Global growth has accelerated, led by the industrialised countries, but there is no sign of a long-awaited pick-up in exports in Finland. Even though the first six months of this year offered a glimmer of hope with rising manufacturing orders, June was a huge setback and now the direction of orders is once again unclear. In addition, tax hikes have cancelled out the rise in household purchasing power. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the situation in trade and other domestic service industries is difficult and they have a weak employment outlook. Another disadvantage is that investment continues to decline.

As if these problems were not enough, it did not stop there. The sanctions against Russia and Russian counter-sanctions hit the Finnish economy both directly and indirectly. We do not know how long the situation will continue like this or even worse. Uncertainty makes companies and households cautious, so investments and larger acquisitions are considered carefully. The sanctions will also curb growth in the rest of Europe both directly and indirectly through weakening confidence. This will deteriorate Finland's economic outlook even further.

Economists are criticised – justly – for too often seeing an upward turn as being six months away. We believe that due to the sanctions a pick-up should not be expected until well into 2015 at the earliest. We estimate that Finland's GDP will contract this year for the third consecu-

tive year and grow very modestly in the next few years. We have reduced our growth forecast for 2015 by 0.7 percentage points to 0.3% and expect only a meagre rise of 1.2% for 2016. The forecast for this year remains intact (-0,5%). We estimate that the level seen in total production in 2007 will not be reached until 2017.

The expected growth of below 0.5% for 2015 means that in practice Finland is only one shock away from a fourth consecutive year of its economy contracting. This did not happen even during the depression in the 1990s.

Slower rise in wages, prices and pensions

Economic growth in Finland continues to be, as in the past few years, significantly slower than in the euro area and in the most important peer countries. This indicates an exceptional underachievement.

The prolonged crawl essentially changes the operating environment and forces us to ask questions we are not used to: how low can some key indicators fall and what problems will that cause?

Due to the lagging performance, employment will weaken more and longer than expected. We forecast the unemployment rate to rise to 9% on average in 2015 and 2016. This would mean that there will be 20,000 unemployed more next year than we previously estimated. For 2016 the change in the unemployment estimate is even greater.

The rise in consumer prices has decelerated quickly in the past few months and will continue to do so. The weak labour market will continue to keep producer and wholesale prices in check. There is no significant domestic price pressure. There should not be any

Finland: Macroeconomic indicators (% annual real changes unless otherwise noted)

| | 2011 (EURbn) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|---|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Private consumption | 105 | 0.1 | -0.7 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.7 |
| Government consumption | 46 | 0.7 | 1.5 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| Fixed investment | 37 | -2.5 | -4.9 | -4.9 | -0.1 | 3.4 |
| Stockbuilding* | 2 | -1.1 | -0.4 | 0.5 | -0.2 | 0.0 |
| Exports | 77 | 1.2 | -1.7 | -0.2 | 2.1 | 4.1 |
| Imports | 79 | 1.3 | -2.5 | 0.3 | 1.4 | 3.6 |
| GDP | | -1.5 | -1.2 | -0.5 | 0.3 | 1.2 |
| Nominal GDP (EURbn) | 189 | 199 | 201 | 202 | 205 | 210 |
| Unemployment rate, % | | 7.7 | 8.5 | 8.7 | 9.0 | 9.0 |
| Industrial production, % y/y | | -8.4 | -2.0 | -2.0 | 2.0 | 3.0 |
| Consumer prices, % y/y | | 2.8 | 1.5 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 0.8 |
| Hourly earnings, % y/y | | 3.2 | 2.2 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 0.8 |
| Current account balance (EURbn) | | -3.8 | -4.1 | -3.9 | -3.4 | -2.8 |
| - % of GDP | | -1.9 | -2.0 | -1.9 | -1.6 | -1.4 |
| Trade balance (EURbn) | | -0.7 | -0.4 | -0.6 | -0.3 | -0.2 |
| - % of GDP | | -0.4 | -0.2 | -0.3 | -0.1 | -0.1 |
| General government budget balance (EURbn) | | -3.5 | -4.1 | -3.7 | -3.9 | -3.4 |
| - % of GDP | | -1.8 | -2.1 | -1.8 | -1.9 | -1.6 |
| General government gross debt (EURbn) | | 103.2 | 110.2 | 116.9 | 123.9 | 130.4 |
| - % of GDP | | 53.6 | 57.0 | 57.9 | 60.4 | 62.2 |

* Contribution to GDP growth (% points)

pressure from import prices either, as energy prices are expected to decline somewhat. Interest rates will also remain low. Based on these factors, we expect the rise in consumer prices to decelerate to under 0.5% in 2015 and to remain below 1% going forward. If this happens, speculation over deflation will start next year.

Lack of economic growth, weaker employment and lower inflation point towards very moderate wage increases during the entire forecast period. Households' aggregate wages and salaries will hardly grow at all. Low inflation and low wage increases will in turn mean quite modest raises to pensions.

The slow trudge of the economy makes it even more difficult to stop the increase in public debt. Without major spending cuts the financing deficit of the state and the municipalities will unavoidably remain large. As a result, losing the highest credit rating will only be a matter of time. Moreover, we are in a weak position to receive the next blow striking the world economy.

Economy up in H2 2015, driven by exports

Our forecast assumes that the economy will start to rise driven by exports. However, exports are not likely to start recovering until much later than previously anticipated: in H2 2015. Improved exports require that investment will gradually gather momentum around the world and that the imports of the most important trading partners will start to grow. A pick-up in export is unlikely to take place soon, as the uncertainty caused by the Russian situation and sanctions holds back investment and there are no signs of a major recovery in the imports of the trading partners either.

Weakness continues in consumption and investment


The weakness of domestic demand is a significant obstacle to growth, and it will take quite a while before domestic demand turns into a growth driver. Weaker employment will weigh on household purchasing power and confidence as well as on private consumption. The outlook of residential construction will not improve gradually until next year, but the output will remain low. Prospects for a pick-up in machinery and equipment investment are for the time being poor.

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
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GDP contracts for the third consecutive year in 2014




Source: Nordea Markets and Macrobond

Exports to Russia are falling




Source: Nordea Markets and Macrobond

Economic sentiment is unusually low



Source: Nordea Markets and Macrobond

Construction outlook is weak



Source: Nordea Markets and Macrobond

Finally kicking into higher gear

- Stronger growth despite risks
- Inflation pressures are building
- QE to end in October – first rate hike in March 2015
- Fed is behind the curve – may have to play catch-up

Although real GDP growth stalled during the first half of 2014, we have little doubt that the US economy is on a self-sustaining growth path that will allow the Fed to start raising interest rates in 2015.

In our view, mid-2013 will mark the transition from three years of US economic growth of close to 2% to three years of around 3% growth. According to recently revised GDP data, the economy expanded at an average pace of 4% in H2 2013. This strength and the 4.2% growth rate currently reported for Q2 make us more confident that the weakness in Q1 largely reflects payback for exaggerated strength in H2 2013 combined with a hit from the weather and strangely weak healthcare spending, rather than a more worrying slowdown in the underlying trend. Current consumer and business confidence indicators support this view.

With the continued fading of several drags, including fiscal tightening, private-sector deleveraging and the credit crunch, the pieces are in place for sustained above-trend growth of around 3% in H2 2014 and 2015.

In 2016, however, a gradual slowdown in activity is expected, towards an estimated 2% potential growth pace as full employment is reached and monetary policy is tightened further.

Heading for full employment

The economy's strength is increasingly showing through

in the job market. Employment rose to a new high in May as the US finally replaced all of the 8.8 million jobs lost during the recession, and job growth has accelerated above 200,000 per month since the start of the year, almost double that needed to reduce unemployment given current labour force growth. Most encouraging is the recent strength in construction, manufacturing and state and local government jobs, most of which are in the middle of the income spectrum.

The pace of job growth seems likely to accelerate further. Employers are posting job openings at pre-recession rates and small business confidence has largely recovered from the recession.

Against this background, we expect unemployment to reach 6% by end-2014, 5½% by end-2015 and 5% by end-2016, assuming a modest increase in the labour force participation rate. According to the Fed, an unemployment rate around 5½% is consistent with full employment. In our view, the full employment rate (NAIRU) is likely closer to 6%.

Wage inflation has been stuck near 2% in recent years. However, with continued diminishing slack in the labour market we expect to see stronger wage growth over the next 3-6 months and a gradual drift higher over the next several years, bolstering real income growth. Small firms are reporting broader gains in compensation plans as well as shortages of qualified applicants, and in the past those trends have tended to lead to a pick-up in wage increases. Also the fact that short-term unemployment has fallen back almost to pre-recession levels suggests that wage pressures are slowly building.

Labour shortages have already emerged in some parts of

USA: Macroeconomic indicators (% annual real changes unless otherwise noted)

| | 2011 (USDbn) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|---|--------------|---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Private consumption | 10.689 | 1,8 | 2,4 | 2,3 | 2,8 | 2,3 |
| Government consumption and investment | 3.169 | -1,4 | -2,0 | -0,5 | 0,9 | 1,0 |
| Private fixed investment | 2.198 | 8,3 | 4,7 | 5,2 | 6,5 | 5,8 |
| - residential | 386 | 13,5 | 11,9 | 2,2 | 7,6 | 7,5 |
| - equipment and software | 838 | 6,8 | 4,6 | 6,3 | 7,2 | 6,3 |
| - non-residential structures | 382 | 13,1 | -0,5 | 8,4 | 6,6 | 5,3 |
| - intellectual property products | 592 | 3,9 | 3,4 | 3,6 | 4,0 | 4,0 |
| Stockbuilding* | 42 | -1,9 | 2,2 | 0,0 | -0,4 | 0,0 |
| Exports | 2.106 | 3,3 | 3,0 | 3,3 | 6,2 | 6,0 |
| Imports | 2.686 | 2,3 | 1,1 | 4,2 | 5,2 | 4,4 |
| GDP | | 2,3 | 2,2 | 2,1 | 3,1 | 2,8 |
| Nominal GDP (USDbn) | 15.518 | 16.163 | 16.768 | 17.408 | 18.322 | 19.255 |
| Unemployment rate, % | | 8,1 | 7,4 | 6,2 | 5,6 | 5,2 |
| Industrial production, % y/y | | 3,8 | 2,9 | 4,0 | 3,6 | 3,4 |
| Consumer prices, % y/y | | 2,1 | 1,5 | 2,0 | 2,3 | 2,4 |
| Consumer prices, ex. energy and food, % y/y | | 2,1 | 1,8 | 1,9 | 2,3 | 2,5 |
| Hourly earnings, % y/y | | 1,9 | 2,1 | 2,1 | 2,4 | 3,1 |
| Current account balance (USDbn) | | -460,8 | -400,3 | -439,8 | -458,1 | -481,4 |
| - % of GDP | | -2,9 | -2,4 | -2,5 | -2,5 | -2,5 |
| Federal government budget balance (USDbn) | | -1089,2 | -680,3 | -500,0 | -475,0 | -550,0 |
| - % of GDP | | -6,8 | -4,1 | -2,9 | -2,6 | -3,0 |
| General government gross debt, % of GDP | | 70,1 | 72,0 | 74,4 | 74,0 | 73,6 |

* Contribution to GDP growth (% points)

the energy, high-tech, manufacturing and transportation industries. The fact that job openings have far outpaced the number of people being hired suggests that US workers might not have the right skills.

Headline and core inflation have increased this year and both (CPI) rates are currently close to the Fed's 2% target. Going forward, we expect core inflation to slowly move higher as evidence of a tighter labour market points to stronger wage increases. At the same time, low rental vacancy rates suggest rents (40% of core CPI) should accelerate further.

Evidence of higher wage increases are expected to cause markets to price in more tightening by the Fed. The result will likely be increases in bond yields and a generally stronger USD over the forecast horizon. Fortunately, US households, businesses and the banking system seem to be prepared for higher rates.

Home prices have rebounded strongly since hitting bottom more than two years ago. Given the better job market and falling rental vacancy rates, home prices are likely to continue rising, at a 3-5% annual pace.

Fed behind the curve

The Fed has already signalled that it is likely to end its bond purchases in October, nearly six years after the first quantitative easing programme (QE) started in late 2008.

With labour market slack diminishing, we believe the first rate hike by the Fed is likely to occur in March 2015. Initially the Fed is expected to tighten slowly, but because the Fed seems to be underestimating inflation risks, we see risks of more aggressive tightening later in the cycle. Rather than outright bond sales, the fed funds rate and the interest rate paid on excess reserves held by banks at the central bank are likely to be the Fed's key tools when it comes to tightening policy.

Currently we expect the fed funds rate to reach 1.25% by end-2015 and 2.50% by end-2016.

Risks to the outlook

In addition to global downside risks to the US outlook, a disorderly response from financial markets to the Fed's QE exit and subsequent rate hikes remains a concern. Another key domestic risk is that US political/regulatory uncertainty continues to hold back business investment. However, there are also upside risks to the US outlook. Thus, we could see a stronger-than-expected rebound in US business investment as pent-up demand is released.


Overall, risks to the US outlook are viewed as roughly balanced.

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
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Above-trend growth appears solid on track



Source: Nordea Markets and Macrobond

The consumer is back – deleveraging has stopped




Source: Nordea Markets and Macrobond

Continued labour market improvement



Source: Nordea Markets and Macrobond

Inflation is creeping up on the Fed



Source: Nordea Markets and Macrobond

No great expectations

- Frustratingly slow recovery
- Domestic demand to firm somewhat
- Weaker euro and slightly higher inflation
- Low ECB rates for years to come

The slow and uneven recovery of the Euro-area economy has come to a critical point. One could actually ask whether this still is a recovery because after four consecutive quarters of growth, GDP stagnated in Q2 and clouds are hanging over Q3. The German engine sputters, France and Italy are held back by structural weakness. Ongoing improvement in countries like the Netherlands, Ireland and Spain cannot compensate for that.

After no growth in Q2, slow growth ahead

Going forward, we still consider slow growth as more likely than stagnation or recession. First, although some sentiment indicators have recently fallen, most are still at a healthy level. We assume that geopolitical conflicts will not escalate further. Headwinds for sentiment from that side should therefore abate. Second, domestic demand should benefit from a less restrictive fiscal policy. However, we do not expect France and Italy to succeed against Brussels and Berlin in their efforts to loosen the Stability Pact significantly. Third, recent indications from the bank lending survey point towards less restrictive lending standards and rising loan demand. Once the ECB's bank stress tests and the Asset Quality Review are over in Q4, banks should become more willing to lend with the support of cheap ECB funding (see below).

Progress in growth-enhancing structural reforms is spread unevenly and will probably continue to be so. France still seems to rely more on help from the ECB and attempts to change fiscal rules than on its own efforts to improve competitiveness. Italy is moving in the right direction, judging from the prime minister's ambitious plans. Implementation is the key, and given decades of standstill there is a long way to go. The pace of reform in Spain seems to be slowing ahead of the big election year 2015, but a lot has been achieved already.

Supportive global environment, despite Russia

For an economy plagued by structural deficiencies and banks still reluctant or unable to lend, export performance is particularly important. In recent years, Euro-area exports have developed broadly in line with global trade. Most recently, exports to Russia were down 17% y/y; they could easily fall by 25% for this year as a whole. That is painful for some companies. However, the Russian economy has been quite weak for a while and many European companies relying on exports to Russia have had time to re-orientate their activities.

In 2013 Russia accounted for 4.7% of Euro-area exports. That is less than exports to Sweden and Denmark combined (5%). The UK, the US and Asia are far more important export destinations. Given our growth outlook for these regions, the overall export environment looks slightly worse than it looked half a year ago, but it is still supportive.

Sentiment effects on growth can be much larger than the direct and indirect impact of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis on trade. But, as mentioned above, we don't expect an escalation.

Growth forecast revised down

With no growth in Q2 and expected slow growth for the rest of this year, we revise down our 2014 forecast for GDP growth to 0.8%. This could roughly be the potential growth rate of the Euro-area economy. We also lower our forecast for 2015 to 1.1% (from 1.5%). That reflects less carry-over from 2014 to 2015, a reassessment of the outlook for the French and the Italian economies and less growth for Germany due to headwinds from abroad. Progress in bringing unemployment down will probably be incremental.

Our first look into 2016 sees growth of 1.4%. Very low interest rates and slightly higher employment should support domestic demand. As monetary policies in the US and the Euro area are moving in different directions, we expect the euro to weaken further. That should help exports. However, the global environment (US, China)

Euro area: Macroeconomic indicators (% annual real changes unless otherwise noted)

| | 2011 (EURbn) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|---|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| Private consumption | 5,427 | -1.4 | -0.6 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| Government consumption | 2,033 | -0.6 | 0.2 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.3 |
| Fixed investment | 1,797 | -3.8 | -2.8 | 1.0 | 2.4 | 3.9 |
| Exports | 4,187 | 2.7 | 1.5 | 3.1 | 4.0 | 3.8 |
| Imports | 4,058 | -0.8 | 0.4 | 3.5 | 4.3 | 4.5 |
| Net exports* | 129 | 0.9 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.1 | -0.2 |
| GDP | | -0.6 | -0.4 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.4 |
| Nominal GDP (EURbn) | 9,444 | 9,483 | 9,579 | 9,699 | 9,906 | 10,176 |
| Unemployment rate, % | | 11.3 | 12.0 | 11.6 | 11.4 | 11.1 |
| Consumer prices, % y/y | | 2.5 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 1.2 | 1.6 |
| Current account balance, % of GDP | | 1.8 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.2 |
| General government budget balance, % of GDP | | -3.7 | -3.0 | -2.5 | -2.3 | -2.0 |
| General government gross debt, % of GDP | | 92.7 | 95.0 | 96.0 | 95.4 | 95.0 |

* Contribution to GDP growth (% points)

could be less supportive by then.

Moderate rise in inflation ahead

It is our long-held view, that the Euro area is one major shock away from deflation. We don't consider the impact from the various geopolitical crises to be such a major shock. Although headline inflation fell to 0.4% y/y in July and could fall again in the short term, there have recently been signs of disinflationary forces not gaining strength, for example a core rate stable around 0.8% y/y and smaller declines in import and producer prices.

We expect base effects from energy prices to lift the headline rate to ¾% in Q4. A weaker euro and slowly decreasing slack in the economy should lead to inflation picking up over time. The inflation rates we expect for 2015/16 (1.2% and 1.6%) justify and require an extremely lenient ECB policy also going forward.

ECB still has an easing bias

Monetary policy rates are at rock bottom, with the deposit rate even being negative since early June. In September and December, the ECB will launch the first two targeted long-term refinancing operations (TLTROs). Though no magic bullet, extremely cheap bank funding should contribute to a better credit environment, keep short rates anchored very close to zero and continue to support spread narrowing in EUR government bond markets. We also expect the ECB to buy asset-backed securities, once preparations are finished.

Asset purchases on a larger scale (quantitative easing, QE) including government bonds are not part of our main scenario. However, if the TLTROs fail and inflation expectations get "de-anchored", QE could become a reality next year. After all, the ECB has done many things over recent months that seemed out of the question before. As bond yields are already so low, the positive impact of such a programme would probably be limited.

The ECB has achieved a lot to rein in the crisis. Since Mario Draghi's "whatever it takes" speech in July 2012, spreads of peripheral bond yields over German bunds have narrowed to multi-year lows. Some countries' bond yields are at all-time lows. And yet, the ECB cannot solve the Euro-area's structural problems. It can, however, continue to buy time for structural reforms to happen, without having the power to enforce the reforms. The fragile recovery will need monetary policy support for a long time. We now expect no rate hikes until end-2016 and only a moderate rise of longer-term bond yields in the wake of higher US Treasury yields.

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
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
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
Not back to strong growth




Improved consumer sentiment, except for France



Credit flows still very subdued



Low ECB rates for a long time



Europe's locomotive faces headwinds from abroad

The German economy is in good shape. We expect it to grow by around 1.5% pa from 2014 to 2016, driven by domestic demand. This would be above the potential growth rate of around 1¼%. We reduced our growth forecasts for 2014 and 2015 due to external factors: the recovery in France and Italy seems to proceed at an even slower pace than we expected earlier. Moreover, as a global supplier of capital goods, the German export sector and its suppliers feel the impact of geopolitical uncertainty. This comes on top of exports to Russia steeply falling.

The recent fall in manufacturing orders and Ifo expectations give rise to a cautious short-term outlook. However, the decline in GDP in Q2 by -0.2% q/q should not be seen as a new trend as it was partly driven by temporary factors such as weather conditions and extra time off after public holidays. Housing construction is likely to pick up again, driven by record-low interest rates and optimistic consumers. Public spending supports growth, too.

Consumer spending will continue to be the main growth driver on the back of a robust labour market. We expect some further increase of wage growth. With inflation remaining low, private households will see real wage increases supporting consumption.

There is a widespread feeling among companies (and beyond) that the euro crisis is still cooking under a calm surface. Moreover, the grand coalition government so far favours social policy over supply side reforms. Against this backdrop, we do not expect a very strong increase in machinery and equipment investment, despite low rates.

Despite stronger domestic demand, the German economy remains dependent on external developments, for better or worse. On its own, it is not strong enough to lift the Euro area out of the quagmire.

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
Ongoing but not very strong growth



Business sentiment affected by uncertainty



Private consumption in good shape



Germany: Macroeconomic indicators (% annual real changes unless otherwise noted)

| | 2011 (EURbn) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|---|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Private consumption | 1,498 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.4 |
| Government consumption | 500 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.0 |
| Fixed investment | 473 | -1.3 | -0.7 | 4.3 | 3.7 | 4.3 |
| Exports | 1,321 | 3.8 | 1.1 | 3.5 | 4.1 | 4.4 |
| Imports | 1,186 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 5.6 | 4.6 | 5.1 |
| Net exports* | 136 | 0.9 | -0.2 | -0.7 | 0.0 | -0.1 |
| GDP | | 0.9 | 0.5 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Nominal GDP (EURbn) | 2,610 | 2,751 | 2,814 | 2,886 | 2,966 | 3,054 |
| Unemployment rate, % | | 6.8 | 6.9 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 6.5 |
| Consumer prices, % y/y | | 2.1 | 1.6 | 0.9 | 1.5 | 1.8 |
| Current account balance, % of GDP | | 7.0 | 7.4 | 7.3 | 7.0 | 6.0 |
| General government budget balance, % of GDP | | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| General government gross debt, % of GDP | | 81.0 | 78.4 | 76.0 | 73.6 | 72.0 |

* Contribution to GDP growth (% points)

Bank of Exit

The UK economy is experiencing a strong domestic recovery. On a quarterly basis growth has been running at 0.7-0.8% for five consecutive quarters, supporting a stable recovery going forward. GDP is above its pre-crisis level and household consumption is showing strong momentum. GDP growth slows in 2015 and 2016 as both monetary and fiscal policy turn less expansionary.

The labour market has improved remarkably. Employment is at historical highs and the employment rate stands at 73%. Unemployment has fallen rapidly and is down to 6.4% in June, the lowest rate since 2008. Productivity growth is still weak but will increase gradually. We expect unemployment to fall at a slower pace going forward.

Real wages have been falling sharply following the financial crisis. When the labour market tightens and skill shortage appears, wage growth will pick up gradually. Inflation has fallen over the past year, partly reflecting lower contribution from food and energy prices. With muted wage growth and GBP appreciation, CPI inflation will rise slowly, approaching 2% in the end of this year.

House prices have risen by 22% from the bottom in 2009, but there are signs of stabilisation, partly as a result of more restrictive lending standards. But it is still rather uncertain if macro prudential tools will cool down the housing market effectively.


The Bank of England clearly contemplates its exit strategy from the current very loose monetary policy. As manifested in recent speeches by Governor Carney, the exit is approaching. The subdued inflation outlook and tighter macro-prudential policy, however, suggest that the BoE will not sanction a first rate hike until the second quarter of 2015. Due to differences in the expected monetary stance, the GBP is expected to strengthen against the EUR but weaken somewhat against the USD.

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
Strong growth momentum...



...and unemployment has fallen sharply



Muted wage growth and slow pick-up in inflation



United Kingdom: Macroeconomic indicators (% annual real changes unless otherwise noted)

| | 2011 (GBPbn) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|---|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Private consumption | 992 | 1.4 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.0 |
| Government consumption and investment | 337 | 1.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Fixed investment | 221 | 0.8 | -0.8 | 7.0 | 4.5 | 2.9 |
| Stockbuilding* | 10 | -0.2 | 0.4 | -0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Exports | 493 | 1.7 | 0.5 | 2.7 | 4.7 | 5.5 |
| Imports | 516 | 3.4 | 0.2 | 1.2 | 3.9 | 4.1 |
| GDP | | 0.3 | 1.7 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.2 |
| Nominal GDP (GBPbn) | 1,537 | 1,558 | 1,613 | 1,698 | 1,776 | 1,856 |
| Unemployment rate, % | | 8.0 | 7.6 | 6.5 | 6.0 | 5.7 |
| Consumer prices, % y/y | | 2.8 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| Current account balance, % of GDP | | -3.8 | -4.5 | -3.9 | -3.2 | -2.7 |
| General government budget balance, % of GDP | | -6.1 | -5.8 | -5.0 | -4.0 | -3.1 |
| General government gross debt, % of GDP | | 89.1 | 90.6 | 91.9 | 92.8 | 93.7 |

* Contribution to GDP growth (% points)

The jury is still out

Abenomics is gaining traction and there are cheerful signs of corporate investment picking up. It has raised hope of putting an end to the economic paralysis that has haunted Japan for two decades. Before this can materialise, corporate tax needs to be cut and return on investment boosted, so fewer companies will shift production overseas. These were among the market-friendly measures unveiled by Abe in late June, when he finally shot off the third arrow. The move has made us turn more optimistic on Japan's medium-term outlook. However, implementation is the key so our cautious stance remains intact.


The latest household spending indicators have been distorted by the sales tax hike in April. If private consumption is to become a stable source of growth in the longer term, wages must rise much faster. Current conditions are favourable in terms of growing corporate profits and a tight labour market. For the first time since the early 1990s, there are enough jobs available for everyone in the labour force, though it is propelled by a decline in labour supply and not a large increase in job creation. Unfortunately, this alone is not enough. Any meaningful wage increase would require a change to the rigid labour market laws that prohibit firing overpaid and unproductive regular workers. Also, employers need to be convinced that the growth revival is not merely temporary and thus be willing to raise base salaries across the board.

Regarding monetary policy the BoJ remains confident to achieve the 2% inflation target against the backdrop of continuously rising inflation expectations. Hence, we see no expansion of the quantitative and qualitative easing (QQE) programme at this point. One factor could affect our view and that is exports, which have been described as weak by the BoJ. Even so, that is expected to improve in the near term on stronger overseas demand. We maintain our forecast of a weaker JPY against the USD on a two-year horizon.


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
Japan is not out of the woods yet



Tight labour market should support wage growth



BoJ confident of achieving 2% inflation



Japan: Macroeconomic indicators (% annual real changes unless otherwise noted)

| | 2011 (JPY bn) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|---|---------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Private consumption | 277,725 | 2.1 | 2.0 | -1.0 | -0.7 | 1.3 |
| Government consumption | 96,117 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.7 |
| Fixed investment | 97,107 | 3.2 | 2.7 | 6.6 | 4.9 | 3.8 |
| Stockbuilding* | -1,883 | 0.1 | -0.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Exports | 71,298 | -0.1 | 1.5 | 5.9 | 4.1 | 3.9 |
| Imports | 75,572 | 5.3 | 3.3 | 5.7 | 4.2 | 5.0 |
| GDP | | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.4 |
| Nominal GDP (JPY bn) | 471,311 | 473,916 | 478,098 | 492,145 | 504,653 | 519,637 |
| Unemployment rate, % | | 4.3 | 4.0 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| Consumer prices, % y/y | | 0.0 | 0.4 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.2 |
| Current account balance, % of GDP | | 1.0 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.5 |
| General government budget balance, % of GDP | | -9.8 | -10.1 | -9.5 | -9.0 | -9.0 |

* Contribution to GDP growth (% points)

Uncertainty weighs

- Economy closer to zero growth
- Geopolitical uncertainty – a major drag
- Government will become the main investor

The Russian economy continues to suffer from numerous negative trends such as low investment activity, weakening consumption growth and increased inflation threats. Geopolitical risks and sanctions imposed by the US and the EU only increase uncertainty over economic growth in Russia. However, a weaker RUB and relatively high oil prices keep the export-oriented economy afloat. We cut our 2014 and 2015 forecasts to 0.5% and 1.2%, respectively. In 2016 we expect a more healthy investment environment and forecast 1.5% GDP growth.

Geopolitics and sanctions

Uncertainty over the situation in eastern Ukraine is weighing on the Russian economy. Sanctions already imposed on Russia are not a big threat but uncertainty over further tit-for-tat sanctions negatively impacts business sentiment and especially capital investment activity, which remains the major drag on the Russian economy.

The US imposed new sanctions on Russia in mid-July. At end-July the EU followed suit, imposing new sanctions on Russia which include an arms embargo and restrictions on exports to Russia of oil (but not gas) exploration technologies. Also, EU citizens and firms are not allowed to buy or sell debt, equity and other financial instruments with a maturity of more than 90 days issued by Russian state-owned banks.

The financial sector will be under more intense pressure. The sanctions practically seriously impede access to Western capital markets. But we cannot say that the external markets will be completely closed for sanctioned Russian companies. Moreover, the government announced its readiness to ease access to budget money to compensate for the increased costs of funding, and the Bank of Russia (CBR) will provide financial institutions with extra rouble liquidity. There is no doubt that higher funding rates will spill over to the internal Russian mar-

ket, which will only aggravate the situation given the rather restrictive monetary policy pursued by CBR.

Weakening consumption and weaker investment

What is even more important is that the anticipation of further sanctions brings a lot of uncertainty, which negatively affects investment activity – a major drag for the Russian economy.

Investment activity has been low since the beginning of 2014, and the situation has even worsened with investors being demotivated by geopolitical uncertainty and the CBR policy. Expectations of low investment coupled with decreasing consumption growth momentum adversely affect the growth outlook for the Russian economy. Retail sales growth has been gradually decelerating since the beginning of 2014 and reached 0.5% y/y in June, which is an exceptionally weak level. The decline was accompanied by decreasing real wage growth. We think that by the end of 2014 household consumption growth will be around 2%, and we see no reason to expect any acceleration in 2015 and 2016. Thus, expectations for consumption growth going forward are not so bright, and it is hard to imagine household consumption as a future strong driver for the economy. Net exports may slightly improve in 2014 driven by lower imports, but in the long run net exports will continue to have a negative impact on overall GDP growth.

As the result we have lowered our forecast for investment, consumption and GDP growth. By end-2014 we expect a 5% y/y decrease of capital investment, 2.7% growth of household consumption and only 0.5% of GDP growth.

Potential points of growth

In the long run we expect geopolitical tensions to fade, which could potentially reduce the level of uncertainty and lift capital investment in 2015-16. Also Gazprom's historical gas deal with China will add its 50 cents. The deal entails a long chain of positive effects, including benefits for Russian steelmakers and other companies involved in construction projects. The deal might contrib-

Russia: Macroeconomic indicators (% annual real changes unless otherwise noted)

| | 2011 (RUBbn) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|---|--------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Private consumption | 27,193 | 7.9 | 4.7 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 1.8 |
| Government consumption | 10,103 | 4.6 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| Fixed investment | 11,950 | 6.4 | -0.1 | -5.0 | 0.5 | 3.0 |
| Exports | 16,941 | 1.4 | 4.2 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 2.0 |
| Imports | 12,164 | 8.8 | 3.7 | -5.0 | 3.0 | 5.0 |
| GDP | | 3.4 | 1.3 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 1.5 |
| Nominal GDP (RUBbn) | 55,967 | 62,218 | 66,755 | 71,919 | 77,226 | 82,617 |
| Unemployment rate, % | | 5.7 | 5.5 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 5.6 |
| Consumer prices, % y/y | | 6.5 | 6.5 | 7.2 | 6.0 | 5.4 |
| Current account balance, % of GDP | | 3.6 | 1.5 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.0 |
| General government budget balance, % of GDP | | -0.2 | -0.8 | 0.0 | -0.5 | -0.7 |

ute about 0.2-0.3% to GDP growth in 2015-16. Turning to the budget, the government may finally change the Russian ‘budgetary rule’ currently in effect and start to invest more in the domestic economy, preferably via infrastructure projects. The January-July budget surplus totalled 1.7% of GDP, and reserves are ample. We expect the government and government-owned companies to become a key driver of investment activity in the country.

The central bank, rates and the rouble

The CBR continues to pursue its inflation targeting policy, with increasing control over the money market and decreasing intervention on the currency market. Given the accelerated CPI growth, which in June reached a post-2011 peak of 7.8% y/y on the back of the weak rouble, the CBR has raised key rates by 250 bp since the beginning of 2014. After Russia banned food imports from countries which imposed sanctions, the risk of higher inflationary pressures intensified as the import ban may add 1-1.5% to CPI growth in the medium term. Hence, the CBR may continue to maintain a rather hawkish stance in 2014. We do not expect any key rate changes during the rest of the year, although we cannot rule out one more hike. In 2015 we expect inflation to decelerate given the anticipation of a stronger RUB and the end of the sanctions war, which would allow the CBR to ease monetary policy.

However, currently the rouble still suffers from capital outflows given the geopolitical tensions around Ukraine, which may continue to weigh on the RUB in the medium term. In the long run, RUB traders will likely shift their focus away from geopolitics back to fundamentals, which remain supportive even despite domestic economic growth problems. The current account surplus is widening, the commodity market is relatively stable, and capital outflows are expected to contract. The RUB may finally restore its lost correlation with oil market dynamics – our oil price forecast of USD 103-109/bbl for 2014-15 is RUB supportive. On the other hand, domestic economic growth problems will cap any RUB gains in the long run.

While the RUB has long-term potential, it can become more volatile as the CBR continues to move towards a more flexible rouble. The CBR plans to complete the transition to a floating exchange rate regime by end-2014. It means that soon the CBR will abandon the corridor band for the RUB. However, it is highly likely that the CBR will reserve the right to intervene in the currency market even after the decision. The only difference will lie in the fact that the potential interventions will be more modest and the mechanism of the interventions will be unknown.

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
Geopolitical risks affect GDP growth




Decelerating retail sales



Inflation pressure – a major challenge



Enough reserves for government expenditures



Recovery loses steam amid new headwinds

Following a -1.4% y/y contraction in Q1, which was affected by one-off factors such as low energy demand and prices, Estonia's economy was confronted with sluggish import demand and a loss of momentum in key export markets (incl. Russia and the Euro area). With the intensification of Russian-related geopolitical risks, exports to the Baltic and selected Euro-area countries will be affected.

The share of goods exports that go to Russia has fallen by a percentage point from the end of last year to 9.6% of exports in June. Agricultural and food products constitute 17% of exports to Russia, of which only 5% is subject to the 6 August import ban imposed by Russia.

Due to the temporary demand shock felt in other exporting countries, not only the sanctioned goods exported to Russia (0.5% of total goods exports), but possibly the whole category of such goods (some 5% of exports) will experience price pressures. Lower food prices together with still falling import prices will result in a subdued recovery of inflation from the end of the year.

Apart from the drag on exports and depressed prices, we expect investment to fall y-o-y in 2014. Overall, the economic recovery will decelerate in H2 after stronger-than-expected 2.2% y/y GDP growth in Q2. The current 5% real wage growth is expected to moderate gradually into next year, hence supporting consumption which will remain the key growth engine. Consumer and retail confidence has remained resilient so far. With the global and Euro-area recovery proceeding, there is no reason to expect a major shift in unemployment unless the East-West crisis escalates. Also public finances have remained stronger than expected due to improving tax collection.


Overall, the economy is expected to re-accelerate only gradually next year as export demand and investment appetite remain constrained by a subtle geopolitical situation. 2016 will see a rise in the share of EU co-financed state investment. With only a gradual recovery in sight for the Euro area, any pick-up in growth momentum in Estonia will likely remain muted.

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
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Exports face headwinds, slow investment recovery



Source: Nordea Markets and Macrobond

Russia and sanctioned goods – share of exports



Source: Nordea Markets and Macrobond

Labour market continues to support consumption



Source: Nordea Markets and Macrobond

Estonia: Macroeconomic indicators (% annual real changes unless otherwise noted)

| | 2011 (EURbn) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|---|--------------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| Private consumption | 8.2 | 4.9 | 4.2 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.4 |
| Government consumption | 3.1 | 3.8 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 |
| Fixed investment | 3.8 | 10.8 | 1.0 | -1.8 | 4.7 | 5.2 |
| Exports | 14.7 | 5.6 | 1.8 | -0.6 | 1.9 | 4.6 |
| Imports | 14.1 | 8.8 | 2.6 | -0.2 | 2.0 | 4.7 |
| GDP | | 3.9 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 2.7 | 3.5 |
| Nominal GDP (EURbn) | 16.2 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 |
| Unemployment rate, % | | 10.0 | 8.6 | 8.1 | 8.2 | 7.6 |
| Consumer prices, % y/y | | 3.9 | 2.8 | 0.4 | 2.0 | 2.5 |
| Current account balance, % of GDP | | -1.8 | -1.1 | -1.2 | -1.6 | -1.8 |
| General government budget balance, % of GDP | | -0.2 | -0.2 | -0.5 | -0.9 | -0.5 |

Post-euro optimism boosts consumer confidence

Latvia may not repeat the Estonian post-euro adoption growth miracle, but with consumer confidence at post-crisis record highs, Latvian consumers are obviously enjoying the benefits of the euro. Indeed, with average annual inflation at just 0.2%, fears of euro-triggered inflation evidently did not materialise. Instead, low inflation and accelerating nominal wage growth resulted in a significant increase in households' real purchasing power.

Domestically-oriented retail trade and construction sectors will remain the key economic growth drivers, whereas activity in export-oriented manufacturing and transport sectors remains subdued. The number of households planning to buy or build a house over the next 12 months has reached an all-time record-high, suggesting that activity in the housing market, which was relatively weak during the whole post-crisis period, may ultimately pick up. The Achilles' heel of the Latvian economy remains capital investments, especially in manufacturing sector, which may undermine the long-term sustainability of economic growth.

The greatest threat to economic development is growing geopolitical tensions in Russia and Ukraine. Russia is Latvia's largest export partner (16% of exports) followed by Lithuania and Estonia, which themselves have significant exposures to Russia. Hence, a worsening situation may trigger negative economic repercussions in the whole Baltic region.

The direct effect of the Russian ban on food product imports is estimated to be quite limited (0.4% of GDP). However, with the Lithuanian, Estonian, Finnish and Polish economies being affected, the indirect longer-term effects may be more significant. On a positive note, the existence of the Incukalns underground gas storage facility (which has a capacity to supply up to 140% of annual gas consumption) ensures that Latvia has virtually no risk of imminent energy supply shocks from Russia.

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Latvian consumers are highly optimistic



Real wage growth is accelerating



Retail trade will drive economic growth



Latvia: Macroeconomic indicators (% annual real changes unless otherwise noted)

| | 2011 (EURbn) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|---|--------------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| Private consumption | 12.6 | 5.8 | 5.4 | 4.1 | 3.5 | 3.7 |
| Government consumption | 3.6 | -0.2 | 3.6 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Fixed investment | 4.3 | 8.7 | -4.3 | 0.4 | 3.4 | 7.4 |
| Exports | 11.9 | 9.4 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 4.0 |
| Imports | 12.9 | 4.5 | -1.7 | 0.6 | 2.3 | 4.2 |
| GDP | | 5.2 | 4.1 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 4.1 |
| Nominal GDP (EURbn) | 20.3 | 22.1 | 23.3 | 24.2 | 25.3 | 26.9 |
| Unemployment rate, % | | 14.9 | 11.9 | 10.6 | 9.5 | 8.4 |
| Consumer prices, % y/y | | 2.3 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 1.7 | 2.0 |
| Current account balance, % of GDP | | -2.5 | -0.8 | -2.0 | -2.5 | -3.0 |
| General government budget balance, % of GDP | | -1.4 | -0.9 | -1.0 | -1.5 | -1.0 |

Cold winds blowing from the East

Lithuania remained among the fastest growing economies in the EU with robust 3.0% and 3.1% y/y GDP growth in Q1 2014 and Q2 2014, respectively. Rapid productivity growth is the major growth driver, which more than offsets negative effects from the shrinking labour force and weak capital investment. Lithuania is to become the first Baltic state to reach the pre-crisis GDP level and to surpass Greece and Portugal (EU old-timers) in terms of GDP per capita (PPS) in 2014.

Rising geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West pose a substantial risk to Lithuania's economic development. The negative effect of recently imposed Russian economic sanctions is estimated to be somewhat limited (-0.8% of GDP). So, all else equal, GDP growth should remain in positive territory both in 2014 and 2015. The Lithuanian food industry has already experienced temporary export bans to Russia (the "milk war" in October-December 2013 and the "sausage war" since January 2014), which apparently did not have substantial long-lasting negative effects.

However, with as much as 19.8% of export (85% of which, however, are re-exports of goods from the EU to Russia) and close to 30% of transport sector revenues coming from Russia, Lithuania has a lot to lose if EU-Russian economic relations continue to cool.

Lithuania will become the 19th member of the Euro zone in 2015 – one year behind Latvia (2014) and four years behind Estonia (2011). As a result of the improved fiscal situation and the upcoming euro adoption, S&P and Fitch upgraded sovereign credit ratings to A-, which eventually pushed long-term borrowing costs to record lows. But consumers are fearful of inflation; more than 30% expects substantial price increases over the next 12-month period. However, similar "euro-driven inflation" fears were observed in Latvia, but expectations largely failed to materialize.

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
Productivity is driving GDP growth



Russia was important export growth driver



Consumers fear "euro-driven" inflation



Lithuania: Macroeconomic indicators (% annual real changes unless otherwise noted)

| | 2011 (LTLbn) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|---|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Private consumption | 66.9 | 3.9 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 3.7 | 4.0 |
| Government consumption | 19.9 | 0.6 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 2.0 |
| Fixed investment | 19.3 | -3.6 | 12.8 | 7.0 | 3.3 | 6.3 |
| Exports | 82.5 | 11.8 | 10.3 | -3.2 | -0.4 | 4.7 |
| Imports | 85.5 | 6.1 | 10.3 | -0.4 | 0.1 | 4.2 |
| GDP | | 3.7 | 3.3 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 4.3 |
| Nominal GDP (LTLbn) | 106.9 | 113.7 | 119.6 | 123.5 | 129.0 | 137.0 |
| Unemployment rate, % | | 13.4 | 11.8 | 10.8 | 10.0 | 9.3 |
| Consumer prices, % y/y | | 3.1 | 1.0 | 0.3 | 1.5 | 2.3 |
| Current account balance, % of GDP | | -0.2 | 1.5 | -1.8 | -3.0 | -2.0 |
| General government budget balance, % of GDP | | -3.3 | -2.2 | -2.2 | -2.0 | -1.0 |

Walk the line

- Beijing seeks to balance growth and reform
- Steady growth means stable employment
- Reforms are vital to sustain long-term potential
- CNY is back to appreciating path

A targeted soft landing

The Chinese economy can be compared to a fast-driving car. In order to make a safe turn, speed must be reduced gradually. That explains why growth deceleration will continue for years to come. Beijing's aim is to push for structural reforms while maintaining steady growth and employment. GDP growth for the coming three years will likely be kept above 7%.

The economy has so far this year followed the same pattern as the previous two years. Emphasis on reform was highlighted in Q1, when investment was held back, production dropped and growth disappointed. In Q2 the growth concern triumphed so the government advanced railway investment and reconstruction of shanty towns that were planned to start later. Thanks to the fiscal stimuli, as well as stronger overseas demand and a broad-based CNY weakening, the economy recovered modestly over the summer.

Short-term momentum will improve

The stronger sentiment in the export sector could last some time. While demand from the US is expected to stay solid, more orders could tick in from China's emerging trading partners. Food exports to Russia is expected to be lifted by the Russian government's 1-year ban on importing agricultural products from the EU, the US, Canada, Australia and Norway. Already a week after the ban was announced, Russia has agreed to buy more fruit, vegetables and pork from China. In addition, the new governments in India and Indonesia have both identified the industrial sector as key to reviving growth and may increase their purchases of Chinese machinery.

The housing market cooled down during H1 and sparked nervousness about the bubble bursting. We see the slowdown as a reaction to the government's prolonged re-

strictions, including the purchase ban, which have been relaxed lately. This should stabilise prices and transaction volumes shortly. Overall, as long as the urbanisation process continues and Chinese households still lack investment alternatives, we stick to our long-held stance of no nationwide housing market collapse.

Credit risk the largest threat to growth

Excess capacity, in which demand for products is less than the potential supply, remains one of our largest concerns about the Chinese economy. This is most evident in the heavy industrial sectors, including chemicals, ferrous and non-ferrous metals. The root of the problem can be traced back to the early stage of China's industrialisation process. At that time demand for fuel, metals and chemicals skyrocketed, making steel and coal mining among the most profitable industries. Not surprisingly, it attracted enormous investment from the well-capitalised state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with support from local governments. Eventually it led to overinvestment and overcapacity. According to the IMF, capacity utilisation across all industries barely tops 70%, 15% points lower than what is perceived as healthy.

The evil twin to overcapacity is deflationary pressure, which is reflected by persistently falling producer prices. As wage costs continue to rise rapidly (by an average of 10%), producers in the heavy industries are squeezed hard on their profit margins. 30% of the large steelmakers have reported losses in H1 this year. Rising losses lower their debt service ability and threaten overall financial stability. Of China's total non-financial corporate debt, about 150% of GDP at the end of 2013, 70% is assumed to be from the SOEs and semi-public companies, which dominate the heavy industries.

The seriousness of excess capacity has not gone unnoticed by the government. Li Keqiang has vowed to address the issue by closing down unused production facilities and cutting new investment in these sectors. A recent report revealed that investment in steel in H1 this year fell by 8.4% compared to the same period last year. 2000 small coal mines will be shut down by 2015.

China: Macroeconomic indicators (% annual real changes unless otherwise noted)

| | 2011 (CNY bn) | 2012 | 2013E | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|---|---------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Private consumption | 16,896 | 8.3 | 7.6 | 7.8 | 8.1 | 8.3 |
| Government consumption | 6,316 | 8.6 | 8.1 | 8.1 | 8.0 | 8.0 |
| Fixed investment | 21,568 | 9.1 | 9.2 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 8.5 |
| Stockbuilding* | 1,266 | -0.4 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.1 | -0.3 |
| Exports | 13,477 | 5.2 | 8.6 | 7.5 | 7.0 | 7.0 |
| Imports | 12,261 | 6.2 | 10.6 | 10.5 | 11.0 | 10.5 |
| GDP | | 7.7 | 7.7 | 7.5 | 7.2 | 7.0 |
| Nominal GDP (CNY bn) | 47,310 | 51,947 | 56,885 | 62,600 | 68,795 | 76,046 |
| Unemployment rate, % | | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.1 |
| Consumer prices, % y/y | | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 3.5 |
| Current account balance, % of GDP | | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.5 |
| General government budget balance, % of GDP | | -2.2 | -1.9 | -2.0 | -2.0 | -2.0 |

* Contribution to GDP growth (% points)

Another visible government effort to deal with the credit risk is to change moral hazard thinking among corporates and hence their borrowing behaviour. Beijing's attitude towards default has changed dramatically since early this year and it is no longer willing to bail out every troubled company. As a result, borrowers of numerous bank loans, bonds and trust products have failed to meet obligations lately. As the defaults have been small in size, the implications have been manageable. We expect the government to continue deflating the credit bubble in a careful manner. Of course, the "too big to fail" players can still count on state support, so a full-blown financial crisis seems implausible at this stage.

We identify several risk factors that each has the ability to jeopardise economic stability, including excess capacity in the heavy industrial sector, debt overload among corporates, the real estate bubble and geopolitical conflicts with the other Asian countries. Nevertheless, the economy will not likely face a hard landing, that is, GDP growth at 4% or lower. This is because the economy remains heavily managed by the central government, which has many tools at its disposal, including public infrastructure investment and monetary easing measures.

CNY strength is here to stay

After a period of government-engineered depreciation, the CNY has returned to the appreciation path, gaining 1.7% versus the dollar since early June. Beijing no longer has a reason to extend the currency weakness as the goal of discouraging speculative inflows was achieved. In fact, there are plenty of arguments for a stronger CNY. First, appreciation will adjust for China's current account surplus. Secondly, domestic purchasing power will be boosted for the hundreds of millions of Chinese who travel and shop abroad. Thirdly, senior officials have repeatedly warned about the potentially large costs of persistent dollar accumulation and urged a pause in FX intervention, which will push the CNY higher. Fourthly, Chinese equity markets are scheduled to be fully accessible for Hong Kong investors by October, creating more demand for yuan assets. Lastly, resumed CNY strength would end the abnormally high demand for foreign currency deposits (from both household and corporate) in the country and reduce risk of a run on yuan deposits.


The CNY will not only become stronger, it is going global as well. Over the past few months, China has been active in expanding offshore yuan centres and making currency cooperation deals with a number of countries. The newly established New Development Bank between the BRICS countries is another sign of China's ambition to gain more international influence.

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GDP growth will keep trending down




Export recovery thanks to the "new" friends



Overcapacity puts pressure on producer prices



CNY back on track



A way out for India

Narendra Modi, the new prime minister, may be just the medicine that India's economy needs. Since being elected in May, he has promised to cut red tape, fight corruption and ease entry barriers for foreign companies. India has a large pool of cheap labour, enabling it to follow China's example of economic success. But the great growth potential can only be exploited through deep structural reforms. Given Modi's strong personality and his majority in Parliament, his growth strategies are likely to be more than just empty talk. Therefore, the medium-term outlook for India is no longer dark and murky.


Due to supply-side bottlenecks, the industrial sector has contributed nearly nothing to growth since 2012. Thus, one high-priority structural initiative is investment in infrastructure and manufacturing. Today, fixed investment in India accounts for 30% of GDP, about the same as in China in the early 1990s. More investment in machinery and equipment could help India become the next world factory and boost its export diversity. Higher goods exports are regarded as a sustainable and preferred approach to adjust the current account balance than simply curbing gold imports. Industrial investment will boost the long-term growth potential as well because of its recognised impact in terms of raising labour productivity. Lastly, India certainly needs more spending on infrastructure, such as transportation and sanitation.

The brighter growth prospects, more transparent governance and easier business conditions are likely to attract more foreign capital, in terms of both direct and portfolio investment. These factors speak for a stronger INR in the medium term. More foreign investment in India could also translate into higher tax revenue to the government and a smaller fiscal deficit. Though still too early to say, the new Finance Minister Jaitley seems keen to demonstrate fiscal discipline, which would be welcoming news for investors. Lastly, the well-liked RBI governor, Mr Rajan, who has been in office for a year, has successfully reestablished the central bank's credibility by committing himself to reduce the sky-high inflation.

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
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India cannot live without industries




Source: Nordea Markets and Macrobond

It is not too late to copy the China miracle



Source: Nordea Markets and Macrobond

Improved c/a balance is INR supportive



Source: Nordea Markets and Macrobond

India: Macroeconomic indicators (% annual real changes unless otherwise noted)

| | 2011 (INRbn) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|---|--------------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Private consumption | 51,419 | 6.0 | 4.8 | 5.2 | 6.8 | 7.8 |
| Government consumption | 10,259 | 7.8 | 4.2 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 2.0 |
| Fixed investment | 27,737 | 3.1 | -1.1 | 0.5 | 4.9 | 6.4 |
| Exports | 21,503 | 9.0 | 5.8 | 6.0 | 7.9 | 10.7 |
| Imports | 27,219 | 11.8 | -1.0 | 3.9 | 6.1 | 11.1 |
| GDP (production approach) | | 4.7 | 4.7 | 5.1 | 5.8 | 6.3 |
| Nominal GDP (INRbn) | 90,097 | 97,918 | 110,136 | 123,092 | 137,752 | 153,638 |
| Wholesale prices, % y/y | | 9.7 | 10.1 | 7.9 | 7.1 | 6.2 |
| Current account balance, % of GDP | | -4.7 | -2.0 | -0.5 | -1.0 | -1.5 |
| General government budget balance, % of GDP | | -7.4 | -7.3 | -7.0 | -6.5 | -6.0 |

Stuck in a growth rut

Not even the cheers from the FIFA World Cup have managed to spur the fragile economy that seems to be stuck in a growth rut. Recent months have seen dismal production figures, shrinking employment and a fall in confidence indicators that does not bode well for investment and spending in the near term. The economic outlook has indeed turned gloomier. We expect growth around 1.5% in 2014 and forecast growth to pick up only gradually during 2015 and 2016. The recovery is expected to be driven by stronger demand from abroad and a weaker BRL. Downside risks mainly stem from the high inflation environment and the decreasing primary fiscal surplus that could erode further this year.

Incumbent President Rousseff is still favoured to win the October election, but the race has re-opened with the death of candidate Eduardo Campos, whose likely replacement Marina Silva is polled neck-to-neck with Dilma Rousseff in a potential second round. The incumbent's popularity has been falling during the past year as a result of the slowing economy and the high inflation, but she is still widely seen as the favourite to win. Whoever wins will face pressure to revive growth, through confidence-boosting policy realignment and/or structural reforms, and tighten fiscal policy to reduce risks of further sovereign credit rating downgrades.


We expect the BRL to weaken slightly over the forecast horizon due to the weak economy, persistent high inflation and rising interest rates in the US. The central bank (BCB) has taken a breather in its efforts to raise domestic policy rates, leaving the Selic target rate at 11% since April. We expect the policy rate to be kept on hold for the rest of this year, as the BCB is more concerned about the economy than inflation. We expect monetary policy to remain tight throughout the forecast horizon as we expect inflation to remain uncomfortably close to the upper end of the inflation target of 4.5% ± 2% during the entire period.

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
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Domestic concerns weighing on growth



Source: Nordea Markets and Macrobond

Further erosion of the fiscal surplus this year



Source: Nordea Markets and Macrobond

Pressures over regulated prices are rising



Source: Nordea Markets and Macrobond

Brazil: Macroeconomic indicators (% annual real changes unless otherwise noted)

| | 2011 (BRLbn) | 2012 | 2013 | 2014E | 2015E | 2016E |
|---|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Private consumption | 2,499 | 3.2 | 2.6 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| Government consumption | 857 | 3.3 | 2.0 | 3.7 | 2.2 | 1.6 |
| Fixed investment | 799 | -4.0 | 5.1 | -2.3 | 4.0 | 4.8 |
| Exports | 493 | 0.5 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 6.5 | 5.3 |
| Imports | 523 | 0.3 | 8.3 | 0.4 | 3.5 | 4.6 |
| GDP | | 1.0 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 2.1 |
| Nominal GDP (BRLbn) | 4,143 | 4,392 | 4,845 | 5,179 | 5,574 | 6,024 |
| Unemployment rate, % | | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 5.8 |
| Consumer prices, % y/y | | 5.4 | 6.2 | 6.5 | 5.9 | 5.5 |
| Current account balance, % of GDP | | -2.4 | -3.6 | -3.3 | -2.9 | -2.6 |
| General government budget balance, % of GDP | | -2.8 | -3.3 | -3.4 | -3.0 | -2.8 |

Transport the last stronghold

Oil prices are expected to be somewhat weaker in the first part of the forecast period as some of the politically-related locked in volumes will return to the market. At the end of the period, investment cuts will weigh on oil supply growth and the market will become gradually tighter. There is a considerable upside risk to our oil price forecast as the oil price outlook for 2015-16 will be clouded by geopolitical unrest in major oil-producing countries.

The North American oil boom mainly driven by the shale/tight production in the US is expected to grow at a healthy rate. The resurgence of North American oil production and a flexible output by OPEC's de facto leader Saudi Arabia will continue to be vital to balance the market and offset the substantial supply disruption we have seen in the MENA region. Thus, the oil market looks well balanced from the outset of the forecast period. But the tide can easily turn. The nuclear talks between Iran and the West are slowly progressing, but it is still too early to say when we will see more Iranian barrels in the market. The risk of political supply disturbances has risen sharply this year due to growing unrest and risk of a division of Iraq and instability in Libya. The US and EU sanctions on Russia are not expected to have any significant short-term impact on oil supplies, but may put the start-up of much-needed new capacity expansion projects on hold.

In addition, galloping cost growth and flattening oil prices have squeezed oil companies' margins. Consequently, new and more expensive oil projects have been put on hold and this will curb supply growth, but with a lag of 2-3 years.

Oil demand growth has shown clear signs of weakness, but we expect it will pick up again with economic growth. China will continue to be the main driver, but at a slower pace than before. The oil demand growth outlook for both the Euro area and Russia looks more subdued as sanctions will weigh on the growth potential. Japan is expected to reduce its demand for oil as some nuclear power stations will restart. The focus on pollution and green energy is expected to increase before the UN climate summit in Paris next year. Fuel efficiency standards and fuel switching will have a growing impact on the oil market in future. How fast the new environmental policies will impact the oil market depends on when technological breakthroughs lead to a big shift in the transportation sector. The transport sector currently accounts for about 60% of global oil consumption, and the use of energy in this sector has so far been more or less shielded from competition.

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
Oil price forecasts Brent – baseline (USD/barrel)

| | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Year |
|-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|
| 2012 | 118 | 109 | 109 | 110 | 112 |
| 2013 | 113 | 103 | 110 | 109 | 109 |
| 2014E | 108 | 110 | 107 | 107 | 108 |
| 2015E | 107 | 104 | 106 | 105 | 106 |
| 2016E | 105 | 103 | 105 | 107 | 105 |


Saudi Arabia produces at record levels



Oil investments slowing



Oil demand split by sector



Risk scenarios

Our baseline scenario is based on the assumption that the global economy continues its gradual shift from crisis to recovery mode, supported by a generally ultra-easy monetary policy stance and less restrictive fiscal policy. In addition, current headwinds from geopolitical concerns including those related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict are assumed to turn to tailwind for global growth as tensions gradually fade.

However, several risks to our baseline could affect the global growth outlook in both a positive and negative direction.

On balance, at this juncture we see the greatest risks on the downside.

Upside risks:

- Stronger-than-expected boost to economic sentiment as geopolitical concerns fade.
- Stronger-than-expected US recovery as pent-up demand is released.
- Less-than-expected tightening of Fed monetary policy.
- Large-scale asset purchase programme (Quantitative Easing, QE) by the ECB, leading to higher growth via wealth effects and a weaker euro.
- An easier fiscal policy line is accepted in the Euro area, increasing aggregate demand.
- Lower oil prices, maybe as a result of increasingly larger shale gas production.
- Structural reforms in key Emerging Markets including India and Brazil.

Downside risks:

- Further escalation of geopolitical tensions (Russia-Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Gaza, Libya), with negative feedback on confidence and potentially higher oil prices.
- Higher interest rates curb demand more than anticipated (potentially as a result of bursting asset price bubbles). Could potentially lead to increased protectionism.
- (Financial) spill-over from emerging-market crisis, potentially triggered by tighter monetary conditions as the Fed normalises policy.
- Chinese housing market collapse.
- US political/regulatory uncertainty continues to hold back business investment.
- Euro-area crisis flares up, potentially stemming from the financial sector (as the Asset Quality Review and stress test might bring worse result than expected; or the ECB gets restricted by a court decision to act as a “lender of last resort”).

Baseline and risk scenarios for global GDP growth



Baseline and risk scenarios for global GDP growth

| | Probability, % | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
|----------|----------------|------|------|------|
| Downside | 25 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.1 |
| Baseline | 60 | 3.3 | 3.8 | 3.9 |
| Upside | 15 | 3.4 | 4.3 | 4.7 |

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